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Abstract
Visual memory holds in mind details of objects, textures, faces, and scenes. After initial expo-
sure to an image, however, visual memories rapidly degrade because they are transferred from iconic
memory, a high-capacity sensory buﬀer, to working memory, a low-capacity maintenance system.
How does visual memory maintenance work? This dissertation builds the argument that the main-
tenance of short-term visual memories is analogous to the act of breathing: it is a dynamic process
with a default behavior that explains much of its usual workings, but which can be observed, overrid-
den, and controlled. Chapter 1 shows how the act of trying to remember more information causes
people to forget faster and to remember less (“load-dependent forgetting” and “overreaching”).
It then shows how the paradigm of evolution can be applied to the problem of maintenance, with
memories competing over a limited memory-supporting commodity, explaining these eﬀects. Chap-
ter 2 presents experiments on metamemory, the ability of people to observe and make decisions
about their own memories. The experiments isolate a component of metamemory that monitors a
memory’s quality as it degrades over time. Chapter 3 connects memory to metamemory, drawing on
work from reinforcement learning and decision theory to liken the problem of memory maintenance
to that of an agent who sequentially decides what to prioritize in a partially observable mind.
iii
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Introduction
when in 2013 geoffrey mutai crossed the finish line of the New York City marathon, he was
breathing hard, having run 26.2 miles in just two hours and eight minutes, winning the race (Belson,
2013). As many elite runners seem to do, he soon slowed to a walk, placed his hands on his hips, took
a few deep breaths, and continued on with an almost impossible calmness that masked much of the
complexity going on inside.
Strenuous exercise, such as running a marathon or biking up a hill, changes the body in many ways:
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internal temperature rises, lactic acid builds up in the muscles, and metabolic production of carbon
dioxide increases (Katz & Sahlin, 1988; Cheuvront &Haymes, 2001). In response, the brain makes
adjustments— for example, increasing the rate of breathing to maintain steady levels of oxygen and
carbon dioxide in the blood (Feldman &McCrimmon, 2008). Patterns of breathing change in re-
sponse to many environmental factors, such as the presence of toxins or the unavailability of oxygen,
most often with the goal of maintaining homeostasis and, ultimately, surviving (Feldman &McCrim-
mon, 2008).
Breathing, though usually automatic, can be brought under conscious control. For example, Lamaze
International teaches breathing techniques to expectant mothers to distract them from the pain of
childbirth (Lothian, 2011). And the Association Internationale pour le Développement de l’Apnée over-
sees the sport of deep freediving, in which competitors plunge as far as possible below sea while hold-
ing their breath. Sighing, singing, speaking and shushing all involve the deliberate sucking of air in-
ward and out. Lastly, becoming aware of one’s own breathing— and the temporary horror of won-
dering what would happen if the thought were never to leave your mind— is a vivid demonstration
of the interplay between eﬀortful and automatic respiration (Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich &West,
2000; Wegner, 2009).
This dissertation is not about breathing. Rather, it is about remembering and forgetting our vi-
sual experiences. But just as computing machines have provided a useful analogy for thinking about
cognition, so too can breathing provide a useful analogy for thinking about the dynamics and control-
lability of memory. This dissertation builds the argument that the maintenance of short-term visual
memories is analogous to the act of breathing: it is a dynamic process with a default behavior that ex-
plains much of its usual workings, but which can be observed, overridden, and controlled. The default
behavior of maintenance and degradation (i.e., its dynamics in the absence of top-down control) is
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well described by an evolutionary process operating over the units of a memory-supporting cognitive
commodity, like attention. Memories can be observed through real-time metamemory, an inward-
looking process that tracks the status of a memory as it degrades over time. And the default behavior
can be overridden and controlled by the processes of directed forgetting and self-directed remember-
ing, which redirect maintenance in accordance with the goals.
The plan of the dissertation is as follows:
This introduction lays the groundwork by reviewing the relevant literature on visual working mem-
ory, metamemory, and directed forgetting.
Chapter 1, a manuscript on the time course of visual memory, describes a set of high-quality for-
getting functions measured through participants’ performance on a visual memory task. These for-
getting functions reveal the inadequacies of current time-based models. Themanuscript then uses
evolutionary dynamics—amathematical framework for describing how information is reproduced in
an environment that is subject to mutation, selection, and random drift— to construct a newmodel
of the time course of maintenance and degradation in visual working memory.
Chapter 2, a manuscript on metamemory, provides an experimental existence proof of a certain
kind of real-time metamemory, whereby, in real time, the memorizer monitors the current quality of
visual memories. This process is useful both because it provides a mechanism for judging confidence
in our memories, and because it can provide the foundation of an adaptive maintenance strategy that
selectively targets memories depending on their strength.
Chapter 3, a manuscript on the control of working memory, begins with an experiment on di-
rected forgetting, in which a memorizer controls the contents of memory according to the demands
of the task. It continues with an experiment on self-directed remembering, in which people adaptively
adjust the target of maintenance according to metamemory beliefs (e.g., by preferentially maintaining
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the best-remembered item when asked to do so). The chapter goes on to present a formal framework
for thinking about memory maintenance, drawing on work from the fields of reinforcement learning
and decision theory to cast the problem of memory maintenance as a partially-observable Markov
decision process. In doing so, it extends the model proposed in Chapter 1 to include self-directed
remembering as well as the real-time metamemory revealed in Chapter 2.
The final chapter reviews the contributions of the dissertation.
Working memory is a storage system that actively holds information in mind and allows for
its manipulation, providing a workspace for thought (Baddeley, 1992; Cowan, 2005). Its capacity is
strikingly limited, perhaps to only a few sights or sounds (Miller, 1956). Using working memory is
eﬀortful: pupils dilate, skin conductance rises, and secondary tasks become impossible to perform
well (Kahneman, 1973). Much of the research on working memory has focused on characterizing
its limits and determining what gives rise to them. For example, working memory capacity is known
to be lower in young children and the elderly (Dobbs & Rule, 1989; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991;
Zacks, 1989; Gathercole et al., 2004), correlates strongly with a person’s fluid intelligence (Conway
et al., 2003; Cowan, 2005), is aﬀected by sleep schedule (Chee & Choo, 2004; Steenari et al., 2003),
and can be impaired in people with mental disorders such as schizophrenia (Goldman-Rakic, 1994;
Gold et al., 1997; Manoach, 2003; Joormann &Gotlib, 2008; Martinussen et al., 2005). From this
work, we have learned a considerable amount about howmuch can be remembered and who is best
at remembering it.
Over the past 50 years, there have been two dominant approaches to studying the processes that
underlie working memory: the first is cognitive psychology, and the second is cognitive neuroscience.
Cognitive psychology is the study of howmental processes aﬀect behavior and thought (Neisser,
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1967). Cognitive neuroscience is the study of the neural substrates of cognition— e.g., the brain
regions and networks that are active when a person thinks or observes— and how those substrates
together produce experience and behavior (Gazzaniga, 2004).
The cognitive psychology approach to studying memory begins with designing a behavioral task
and then proceeds by adjusting the task demands, altering the information that is presented (e.g.,
the number of stimuli, the format of presentation, or the category of object or sound) or the dura-
tion of the retention interval, which is the time between when the information is initially presented
and when it is later accessed to perform a task. This approach has a long tradition in experimental
psychology that goes back to Ebbinghaus’ 1885 bookÜber das Gedächtnis, in which he measured for-
getting curves that track the amount remembered as it falls over time.
The cognitive neuroscience approach, in contrast, catalogs the neural substrates of encoding and
maintaining visual information in working memory. Working memory is supported by a control net-
work that includes the prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, and parietal cortex (Baddeley, 1992; Voytek &
Knight, 2010; Xu &Chun, 2005; Todd &Marois, 2004), acting in conjuction with posterior regions
that support storage (Postle et al., 1999; D’Esposito & Postle, 1999; Harrison & Tong, 2009; Emrich
et al., 2013). One of the most relevant findings is the existence of contralateral delay activity (cda),
which is event-related potential (erp) activity sustained during the maintenance interval of a mem-
ory task. The amplitude of cda tracks howmuch is remembered, and individual diﬀerences in cda
amplitude are correlated with individual diﬀerences in memory capacity (Vogel &Machizawa, 2004).
Cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience are not the only approaches to understanding
working memory. A third approach, the computational approach, delineates three levels of analysis
that are needed to explain any cognitive phenomenon: the computational, the algorithmic, and the
physical (Marr, 1982; Chater &Oaksford, 1998). The computational level considers the structure of
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the problem that the person (or system) faces, the information that is available, and the logic of the
possible solutions to that problem. The algorithmic level considers the rules by which a solution is
carried out. The physical level considers how those rules translate to a working biological system.
Though this flavor of thinking is largely absent from theories of visual working memory, there is
a strong precedent for it in the context of long termmemory. John Anderson, a cognitive scientist
at Carnegie Mellon, provided (alongside colleagues) the first rational analysis of human memory
(Anderson, 1989; Anderson &Milson, 1989), introducing the approach to the study of higher-level
cognition (Chater &Oaksford, 1998). Anderson proposed that the problem of long termmemory
is that of retrieving relevant information in a setting where retrieval is costly and relevance is uncer-
tain (Anderson &Milson, 1989). In later work with Lael Schooler, the two found that the availability
of a memory reflects the probability that the information it contains will be needed again in the fu-
ture, as determined by the statistics of reoccurrence as experienced in the environment (Anderson
& Schooler, 1991). The classic power-law forgetting functions of long-termmemory (Ebbinghaus,
1913; Wixted & Carpenter, 2007; Wickelgren, 1974) were shown to naturally reflect the power-law
reoccurence of experiences in the environment— e.g., the names found in headlines ofTheNew York
Times or words encountered in the verbal interactions of children (Anderson & Schooler, 1991).
One example of a rational analysis of visual working memory is from Sims et al. (2012), which
proposes that the problem of visual working memory is that of transmitting visual information from
one point in time to another. In this formulation, solutions to the problem of visual memory take the
form of encoders and decoders that maximize performance on a task. Sims et al. (2012) found that
formulating the problem of working memory in this way does an excellent job of predicting behav-
ioral performance and its dependence on the statistics of the visual input.
This dissertation poses the problem of visual working memory diﬀerently because it takes seri-
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ously the idea that maintenance is an active and controllable process (Jonides et al., 2008). In this
light, the problem of visual working memory is seen as that of encoding visual information, main-
taining it over a short duration, and then later accessing it to perform a task well. This dissertation
combines the cognitive psychology and computational approaches to explore the rules by which
memory maintenance operates. This entails considering the space of possible maintenance strategies
and how that space is constrained by experiments on the default behavior, structure, and observabil-
ity of memory. One such constraint is metamemory.
In 2000 and 2004, ken jennings and brad rutter were contestants on the American game show
Jeopardy!, in which players display their knowledge of trivia by quickly responding with a question
whose answer matches the provided clue. Jennings and Rutter were two of the most successful con-
testants in the show’s history, winning just shy of 6 million USD between them (Jeopardy Produc-
tions, 2014). Strong players often know the answer immediately and have it ready before buzzing
in, but metamemory provides a useful tool when they don’t. Metamemory is an awareness of one’s
memories and the systems that store them. It is particularly useful in Jeopardy! because of two prop-
erties of the game’s design: the first player to “buzz in” is the one given the chance to respond, and
incorrect responses are penalized. Metamemory can thus help in two distinct ways. First, a player can
press the buzzer even before having recalled the correct response, using the following second or two
to retrieve the relevant information. Second, a player can avoid buzzing in when they are uncertain or
unlikely to respond correctly.
Metamemory is useful beyond Jeopardy!, extending to our everyday lives. It helps us to determine
that we are uncertain, to know when to ask for a reminder and who to ask for it, and to form beliefs
about our ability to remember certain kinds of experiences and events. Metamemory is often studied
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in the context of long termmemory, where it is invoked to explain phenomena such as tip-of-the-
tongue states and the feeling of knowing (Flavell &Wellman, 1977; Wellman, 1977; Brown, 1991).
Healthy individuals have a rich set of metamemory skills that guide learning, decision making, and
action (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994). Neurological diseases, such as Alzheimer’s and Korsakoﬀ ’s
syndrome, adversely aﬀect metamemory judgments, causing a mismatch between what is remem-
bered and what is believed to be remembered (Pannu & Kaszniak, 2005).
Memories can be forgotten intentionally. Experiments on this process of “directed forget-
ting” often ask participants to study some information and then later direct them to remember or
forget specific elements of what was studied (Muther, 1965; Bjork et al., 1968). Memory tends to
be better for the to-be-remembered information than for the to-be-forgotten information. For ex-
ample, in Woodward & Bjork (1971), participants studied a list of words and later were asked to re-
call as many of them as possible. This is the popular free recall paradigm used extensively in studies
of long-termmemory. Following each word’s presentation, a cue appeared instructing the partici-
pant either to remember or to forget the word. Later, participants were asked to recall all the words
from the studied list, regardless of how those words initially had been marked. The recall task was
challenging. Critically, its diﬃculty depended on how the word had been marked: those marked as
to-be-remembered were recalled 23.3% of the time, whereas those marked as to-be-forgotten were
recalled only 4.7% of the time. This is the hallmark of directed forgetting, which has been demon-
strated in both long- and short-termmemory and was a popular topic of memory research in the
1970’s (Woodward & Bjork, 1971; Muther, 1965; Bjork et al., 1968; Block, 1971; Bjork, 1972; Ep-
stein, 1972; Burwitz, 1974; MacLeod, 1975).
Directed forgetting is intimately related to cognitive control and to the processes that determine
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our conscious thoughts frommoment to moment (Macrae et al., 1997). For example, experimen-
tally adding cognitive load decreases people’s ability to suppress unwanted thoughts (Wegner & Er-
ber, 1992), and young children and the elderly have deficits in attentional processing, which makes
it more diﬃcult for them to abandon memories and thoughts that are no longer relevant (Harnish-
feger & Bjorklund, 1993; Bjorklund &Harnishfeger, 1990; Passolunghi & Siegel, 2001; Hartman &
Hasher, 1991).
Memory, metamemory, and directed forgetting are the building blocks of this dissertation,
which begins by describing the default behavior of memory maintenance, goes on to show that the
memory state produced by that undirected behavior can be observed through metamemory, elabo-
rates and constrains the ways that maintenance can be controlled, and then proposes a formal frame-
work for the problem of memory maintenance in a partially observable mind.
We begin with the default behavior.
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Evolutionary dynamics of visual memory
1.0 Abstract
Visual memory enables a viewer to hold in mind details of objects, textures, faces, and scenes. After
initial exposure to an image, however, visual memories rapidly degrade because they are transferred
from iconic memory, a high-capacity sensory buﬀer, to working memory, a low-capacity mainte-
nance system. Here, we extend the classic depiction of the dynamics of visual memory maintenance
to include competitive interactions between memories, fluid reallocation of a memory-supporting
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commodity, and a stability threshold that determines the weakest memory that can still be main-
tained. The proposed model, based on these principles, can be understood as an evolutionary process
with memories competing over a limited memory-supporting commodity. Themodel reproduces the
time course of visual working memory observed in a series of experiments. Notable features of this
time course include load-dependent stability and overreaching, in which the act of trying to remem-
ber more information causes people to forget faster, and to remember less, respectively. Our results
demonstrate that evolutionary models provide quantitative insights into the mechanisms of memory
maintenance.
1.1 Introduction
Memories typically degrade until, at last, they are forgotten. From its inception, research on memory
degradation has characterized forgetting functions that track the downfall of howmuch is remembered
over time (Wixted & Ebbesen, 1991; Ebbinghaus, 1913). A forgetting function is shaped by the pro-
cesses that degrade and maintain memories, and its functional form often provides a signature of
the underlying mechanisms (Wixted, 1990). Examining forgetting functions can thus reveal impor-
tant insights, having previously provided some of the primary evidence for iconic memory (Sperling,
1960) and for rational theories of adaptive forgetting (Anderson, 1989; Anderson & Schooler, 1991).
In the case of visual memory, which holds in mind the details of what was seen, at least three sub-
systems contribute to storage and maintenance. Each subsystem has a characteristic timescale, for-
mat, and neural substrate. Iconic memory, a high-capacity sensory buﬀer, operates over short time
scales (0.05–1 s) and is thought to result from persistence of activation in mid- to high-level visual
areas such as the lateral occipital complex and temporal cortex (Sperling, 1960; Keysers et al., 2005;
Ferber et al., 2005). Visual working memory, an active maintenance system, operates over moderate
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time scales (0.5–20 s) and is supported by a network that includes prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia,
and parietal cortex (Baddeley, 1992; Voytek & Knight, 2010; Xu &Chun, 2005; Todd &Marois,
2004). Visual long-termmemory, a high-capacity passive store, operates over lengthy time scales
(minutes to decades) and recruits much of the same machinery that supports more general forms of
long-termmemory, such as the hippocampus (Brady et al., 2011b). Other subsystems have been pro-
posed, each with its own particular properties and substrates (Sligte et al., 2008; Magnussen, 2000;
Wood, 2009). Together, these systems maintain visual memories, allowing us to remember what we
see.
The classic forgetting function of visual memory, which is applicable to short and moderate time
scales, has a brief period of rapid decline followed by a long plateau, a form that is attributed to the
quick fading of iconic memory and the stability of working memory (Sperling, 1960). This model
has survived for over 50 years with only slight modification (Box 1) (Zhang & Luck, 2009). Here,
we extend the classic model to account for new data, leveraging the tools of evolutionary biology to
model memories as entities that compete for a limited mental commodity that is shared among them.
In a series of experiments, we asked participants to remember a set of objects, and then after a short
delay, to report the color of a randomly selected object using a graded continuous-report procedure
(Fig. 1 andMethods). We tested a five-hundredfold range of durations (0.03–16 s) and a twelve-fold
range of loads (1–12 objects), randomly interleaving them all. We used the resulting data to derive a
set of high-quality forgetting curves (Methods). These revealed eﬀects unnoticed by previous studies,
which have typically kept load or duration fixed or varied each in a blocked design, rarely manipu-
lating both. Complete coverage of duration and load enables us to compare changes over time with
minimal contamination by diﬀerences in initial encoding; and by using graded rather than discrete
responses, we gain higher eﬃciency in detecting the presence of weak memories and the ability to
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distinguish weak memories from those that are completely forgotten.
.
Box 1
The classic model of the time course of visual memory
Experiments in the 1960s revealed the existence of iconic memory, a high-capacity sensory buﬀer
whose contents are short-lived, fading within a second (Sperling, 1960). At the time, working
memory was assumed to be stable, with stored objects remaining there indefinitely. The forgetting
function of the classic model, defined by the number of objects remembered at time t, is given by
y = β+ exp( t=τ);
where τ is the mean lifetime of an iconic memory and β is the capacity of working memory (Ap-
pendix A).
The pure death model
The pure death model extends the classic model to accommodate degradation in working mem-
ory. We formalize this degradation as a concurrent process of exponential decay that happens
more slowly than iconic decay (Appendix A).
The sudden death model
The sudden death model extends the pure death model by proposing a 4-second window of time
in which working memory is immune to degradation (Zhang & Luck, 2009) (Appendix A).
++
Stare at the center
++
Present display
++
Delay  
+
Report
++
Cue an item
Figure 1: The memory task. Participants stare at a small cross at the center of the screen. A set of colorful
dots briefly appears. After a delay, the location of one of the dots (selected at random) is marked with a cue.
The participant is asked to report the color of the dot that appeared at the marked location. Performance is
assessed by comparing the reported color to the true color. Here, the participant makes a large error, reporting
the green object as orange.
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1.2 Results
1.2.0 Memory stability depends on load
Participants’ errors on the memory task were used to derive forgetting curves that track the number
of remembered objects as it falls over time (Fig. 2a, Methods). Fitting an exponential function sep-
arately to the data from each memory load, we found that the rate of forgetting depends on the total
amount of information held in mind, with lone memories lasting longest (estimated mean lifetime
of 157 s) and higher loads leading to progressively shorter lifetimes (Fig. 2b–d, Methods). The re-
lationship between memory load and mean lifetime is well described by a power law with exponent
–1.7 (r2 = 0.98, p = 6.5 10–8), such that halving the load leads to roughly a tripling in mean lifetime
(Fig. 2b). This relationship was also found when limiting analysis to durations greater than 1 s, where
iconic memory plays no role (Sperling, 1960; Yang, 1999) (Fig. 2c). In the initial analysis, we as-
sumed that the forgetting function is exponential-like (Box 1, Eq. 1). To test whether load-dependent
stability is robust to this assumption, we also considered another functional form—a power law.
Power law forgetting has been observed in long-termmemory (Wixted & Ebbesen, 1991) and is
common because it can arise both normatively (i.e., as the optimal solution to a task) (Anderson,
1989) and as an artifact of averaging exponential-like forgetting functions that diﬀer in timescale (An-
derson & Tweney, 1997; Anderson, 2001). We found a comparable eﬀect of load-dependent stability
under power law forgetting (Fig. 2d).
1.2.1 Crossovers and overreaching
The lines of the forgetting functions for each load cross (Fig 3a). At short durations, presenting a
greater number of objects causes more to be remembered. At long durations, however, the oppo-
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Figure 2: Load-dependent forgetting: the more you try to remember, the faster you forget. (a) Subplots show
the empirical forgetting function for each load (K = 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, or 12 objects), tracking the number of re-
membered objects as it falls over time. The dashed black and solid grey curves assume an exponential form
to the forgetting function; the former is fit to all the data and the latter considers only durations of at least 1 s,
where iconic memory plays no role. The dotted red curve assumes that forgetting follows a power law. Curves
were fit to the data from each load separately (Methods). Error bars here and in other figures are 95% cred-
ible intervals. (b) Comparing lifetimes across loads, the relationship is well described by a power law with
exponent -1.66. (c) This relationship also holds for the estimates derived from durations of at least 1 s, where
iconic memory plays no role. (d) A similar relationship is found for degradation under power law forgetting,
quantified by the scaling exponent, which falls precipitously with load.
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site is often true: presenting a greater number of objects causes fewer to be remembered (Fig 3b).
Crossovers in the forgetting function imply that the relationship between the number of objects pre-
sented and the number remembered changes with time. (Fig 3c).
The presence of crossovers suggests a flawed strategy of the participants, who presumably control
howmany objects they encode and maintain. Like a bodybuilder who herniates a disk by straining to
lift too heavy a weight, our participants performed worse because they tried to encode and maintain
more than they could handle—they overreached. A comparable eﬀect has been reported for tracking
many moving objects at once, which is a task that is demanding of attention (Holcombe &Chen,
2013). Alternatively, it is possible that participants chose appropriately when deciding howmany
objects to encode or maintain, but that the presence of distracting objects led to flawed execution of
the chosen strategy (Vogel et al., 2005). Crossovers are inconsistent with the classic model and its
variants, whose lines occasionally meet, but never cross (Box 1; for details, see Appendix A).
1.2.2 Evolutionary model
To explain these results, we propose an account of visual memory rooted in evolutionary dynamics,
a mathematical framework for describing how information is reproduced in a setting that is subject
to mutation, selection, and random drift (Nowak, 2006). Specifically, we describe an evolutionary
process operating over a commodity that supports memory. This commodity may take any one of a
number of forms, including (for example) cycles of a time-based refreshing process (Vergauwe et al.,
2009) or populations of neurons in prefrontal cortex representing “token” encodings of visual events
(Bowman &Wyble, 2007). Nomatter its particular form, what defines a commodity is being a lim-
ited asset, at least partially shared across memories, whose availability aﬀects performance. A shared
commodity stands in contrast to a purely local substrate that represents specific stimulus attributes in
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Figure 3: Crossovers in the forgetting function and overreaching. (a) Each subplot is a pairwise comparison
of the forgetting functions for two memory loads, with the greater load K plotted in green and the lesser load
L in blue. Shaded error bars show 95% credible intervals at each time point. (b) The strength of evidence
for a crossover between the forgetting functions for a pair of loads K and L is expressed as twice the natural
logarithm of the Bayes factor B(K,L) in favor of a model with crossover over one without it (Kass & Raftery,
1995) (Methods). In the heat map, B(K,L) is coded as positive (green) when the evidence favors the crossover
model and as negative (blue) when it favors a model without crossover. (c) The crossover effect implies that
the relationship between the number of objects presented and the number remembered will change over time.
The plateau at 3 objects for short durations is considered to be the signature of visual working memory’s
meager capacity. However, the non-monotonic curves seen for durations greater than 1 s are new and suggest
a failure on the part of participants, who would have performed better by trying to encode less of the display.
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particular locations of the visual field (Franconeri et al., 2013). Though such location- and content-
based substrates are essential for encoding information into working memory, they are perhaps less
relevant to memory maintenance, which may operate over a more pluripotent medium (Bowman &
Wyble, 2007).
Recent work has sought to determine both the quantization (Zhang & Luck, 2008; Bays &Husain,
2008) of the commodity and the structure of the memories that it forms [e.g., whether they form
bound objects (Luck & Vogel, 1997), bags of unbound features (Fougnie & Alvarez, 2011), or hi-
erarchical bundles of features (Brady et al., 2011b)]. In the general case, the commodity is divided
intoN quanta, each of which is dedicated to some information about a memory structure. Discrete
“slot”-based models setN  4, whereas “continuous resource” models consider the limit asN tends
to infinity (Zhang & Luck, 2008; Bays &Husain, 2008; Cowan, 2001; Wilken &Ma, 2004).
Wemodel the evolution of the quantal population using a generalization of theMoran process.
TheMoran process is a model of evolution in finite populations that was originally used to describe
the dynamics of allele frequencies (Moran, 1958), and which has recently been leveraged to describe
evolutionary processes in diverse settings, including frequency-dependent selection, emergence of
cooperative behavior, and cultural evolution of language (Nowak et al., 2004; Fudenberg et al., 2006;
Komarova &Nowak, 2003). TheMoran process begins with a population of quanta (the units of the
commodity) that have been assigned to structures (which may be objects, features, bundles, etc.). At
each time step, a quantum becomes degraded, losing the information that it stores. In the same step,
the lost information is replaced by the contents of another quantum, randomly selected from them
all (Fig. 4). Our generalization further introduces a stability threshold: if at any point a structure has
fewer than s quanta assigned to it, it becomes inaccessible to the maintenance process and the asso-
ciated quanta lose their assignment, floating freely until they are reassigned (Fig. 4, grey dots). This
18
threshold is comparable to a recently-proposed lower bound on the fidelity of an accessible memory
(Brady et al., 2013) and has the eﬀect of limiting the number of structures that can be stored to ap-
proximatelyN=s. When the stability threshold is a single quantum, we can derive the forgetting func-
tion analytically (Appendix A); for greater values of the stability threshold, the forgetting function
is obtained numerically. Over time, the number of quanta assigned to a structure drifts. Eventually,
either a single structure reaches fixation, with all the quanta assigned to it, or corruption prevails and
all the quanta are left free-floating and unassigned.
Various cognitive processes could give rise to these dynamics. First consider a process of active
maintenance that recycles the memory commodity, repurposing quanta dedicated to lost memories
in order to provide redundancy to those that remain. Alternatively, consider a process of interference
where at each time step a quantum becomes corrupted, taking on the value and assignment of an
intruding quantum. In these ways, the evolutionary process can be seen as a formal model of memory
maintenance in the face of degradation due to interference or decay.
Each component of the evolutionary model— the commodity, the degradation process, and
the stability threshold— contributes to the resulting dynamics. When a memory structure loses a
quantum and hits the stability threshold, that structure is lost. This happens quickly at first, but more
slowly over time, because the loss of one memory lends stability to those that remain. When there are
many objects to remember, the memory commodity is spread thinly, with fewer quanta per memory
structure, and so each one stands closer to the stability threshold. In contrast, when there are fewer
objects to remember, the representation of each one is more stable. This discrepancy accounts for the
relationship between lifetime and load and may also explain the remarkable stability of lone memo-
ries, which need not compete at all for the memory commodity.
The proposed evolutionary process reproduces the observed forgetting functions of visual mem-
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Figure 4: Modeling the evolution of a memory-supporting commodity. (a) In the top row, a pool of 9 unal-
located quanta (grey dots) that wait to be assigned. In the second row, each quantum is assigned to one of
three structures, labeled in orange, red, and purple. Subsequent rows show the process as it plays out over
time, one time step per row. An empty circle denotes the quantum that died and a circle with a plus mark de-
notes the quantum that was selected to replace it. When the number of quanta assigned to a structure drops
below the threshold (s = 2 in panel a and s = 3 in panels b and c), the remaining quanta become inaccessible
to the maintenance process and lose their assignment (greyed-out dots). Numbers to the right of the panel
count the number of quanta dedicated to each structure at that time step, with superscripts showing which
structure gains, +, loses, –, or both,. The number of stored structures corresponds to the number of unique
colors in a row. In this run, the orange structure reaches fixation. (b) A second iteration of the process, with 12
quanta and 4 objects. At the last time step that is displayed, the blue structure is the only one left, but it has
not yet reached fixation, with much of the commodity left unassigned. (c) A third iteration, with 15 quanta and
5 objects. Red takes an early lead, but is eventually overcome by green.
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ory, showing eﬀects of load-dependent forgetting and overreaching, eﬀects that are inconsistent with
the classic, pure death, and sudden death accounts, which show neither eﬀect (Fig. 5, Methods, and
Appendix A). In the classic account (Fig. 5, grey dashed lines), only iconic memory degrades; the
stability of working memory produces flat forgetting functions with no slope and which do not cross.
In the pure death account (Fig. 5, blue dashed lines), working memory decays at a fixed rate that is
independent of load; this produces sloped lines that share a common decay rate (mean lifetime) and
never cross. The same is also true of the sudden death account (Fig. 5, yellow dashed lines), which
extends the pure death account by proposing a 4-second window of time in which working memory
is immune to degradation (Zhang & Luck, 2009). Only the proposed evolutionary process produces
both eﬀects (Fig. 5, green solid lines).
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Figure 5: Comparing the forgetting functions of the classic, pure death, sudden death, and evolutionary mod-
els. Subplots show the forgetting function for a particular load (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, or 12 objects). Competing mod-
els fail to capture important aspects of the data. The classic model (grey dashed line) does not change over
time. The pure death model (blue dashed line) has a fixed rate of forgetting, one that is too quick for low loads
(K = 1, 2, and 3) and too slow for high loads (K = 8 and 12). The sudden death model behaves similarly to the
pure death model. The evolutionary model succeeds, with slow forgetting at low loads and quick forgetting at
high loads (best-fit parameters N = 58, p = 0.82, tstep = 0.01, and s = 7). The form of each forgetting function
is derived in Appendix A. We also considered the effect of individual differences on the predictions of each
model (see Figs. 7–12).
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1.3 Discussion
Wemodeled memory degradation as an evolutionary process operating over the quantal units of a
memory-supporting commodity. The proposed model, a generalization of theMoran process with a
stability threshold, captures important features of the forgetting functions of visual working memory.
First, the stability of a memory depends on the load, with lesser loads leading to progressively longer
lifetimes. Lone memories are remarkably stable, with lifetimes on the order of minutes. In contrast,
in the context of high loads, memories degrade quickly, in just a handful of seconds. The relationship
between load and mean lifetime—load-dependent forgetting—is well characterized by a power law.
Second, the lines of the forgetting functions at diﬀerent loads cross, implying a failure of the partic-
ipants to encode or maintain an amount of information that was commensurate with their abilities
to maintain it. This is overreaching. These features follow naturally from the proposed evolutionary
process, but are absent from previous models.
In the context of visual working memory, encoding and maintenance are often viewed as a process
in which a limited store fills up during encoding and then remains mostly stable, perhaps with whole
object representations being lost one by one over time. Importantly, in this view, encoding and main-
tenance happen independently over stored objects, resulting in exponential decay functions with a
rate shared across diﬀerent loads. Load-dependent forgetting suggests an alternate view: visual mem-
ory representations compete for a commodity that is at least partially shared among them, such that
the success of maintenance for one structure is aﬀected by that for the others, thereby introducing a
dependency of forgetting on load. Our proposed evolutionary model is the simplest instantiation of
this principle, with a mental commodity fully shared across representations.
The capacity of working memory is often described as a small and stable “magical” number, one
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that began life as 7±2 chunks, later slipped to 4, and now hovers restlessly at 3, 2, or even just one
(Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956; Rensink, 1999; McElree, 2001). The proposed evolutionary model and
its load-dependent stability may help to explain why these magical numbers are so pervasive. In our
model, when content is lost frommemory, due to either interference or decay, the commodity that
had previously been assigned to that content is co-opted for use elsewhere. This interference (or re-
allocation) brings stability to the structures that remain, such that it becomes increasingly diﬃcult
to lose the next one. Nomatter howmany structures the quantal resource is initially spread among,
within a short time most of the structures are lost. The forgetting functions therefore spend the bulk
of their time hovering at only a small handful of objects.
It is conceivable that the proposed process could be used to describe both iconic and working
memory, together, as a single process. Iconic memory was initially considered to be a unitary system,
but was later fractionated into two distinct subcomponents, one providing visible persistence (i.e., the
experience of seeing a stimulus after its removal), the other providing informational persistence (i.e.,
remembering something about a stimulus after its removal) (Coltheart, 1980). Visible persistence is
distinct in its phenomenology from working memory, as memories are rarely experienced as being
seen, but informational persistence and working memory have long been conflated. For example,
studies of visual working memory often test at durations of 500–1000 ms, a point in time at which
there is a non-negligible contribution of iconic memory to task performance (Yang, 1999). We find
that the evolutionary model provides excellent fits to the forgetting functions of iconic memory that
have been measured in previous experiments (Fig. 6). Experimental evidence of a distinct iconic
storage system underlying informational persistence comes from a variety of experiments, not all of
which rely on its timing (e.g., see Becker et al., 2000). However, the closeness of fit between model
and data suggests that informational persistence in iconic memory may be the initial moments of
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maintenance in a lengthier short-term storage system.
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Figure 6: The evolutionary model can be used fit the full time course of visual memory as a single process.
Data are replotted from Yang (1999). Each subplot is data from the participant whose initials appear in the
bottom left corner. The stability threshold was fixed at s = 1 (see Methods).
Evolutionary dynamics provides a rich framework in which to extend our account of visual mem-
ory. For example, it is likely that the neural substrate over which visual memory maintenance op-
erates is in some way structured—perhaps as a gridded visuotopic maps like those found in visual
areas in the brain, or as a scale-free network, like so many other biological systems (Franconeri et al.,
2013; Gardner et al., 2008; Schira et al., 2010). Evolutionary graph theory, which extends evolution-
ary dynamics to structured populations, is a natural tool for specifying the interaction network of the
memory commodity and exploring how such structure impacts the stability of memories (Lieber-
man et al., 2005). Similarly, frequency-dependent fitness, where the success of an individual depends
on the abundance of that individual’s type, is analogous to a memory maintenance policy that selec-
tively maintains memories according to their stability (e.g., by purifying, selectively maintaining the
strongest memories, or balancing, selectively maintaining those memories on the brink) (Nowak
et al., 2004).
By constructing an evolutionary model of memory degradation that operates over the natural units
of visual memory allocation and maintenance—those of a memory-supporting commodity, rather
than whole objects—we are able to build better process models of memory maintenance and its dy-
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namics. Here, we focused on short-term visual memories. But just as the framework of evolutionary
theory has been applied across many domains and scales, from alleles to words and from cells to soci-
eties, so too might our approach, when appropriately extended, be applied to memory maintenance
in more complex systems, such as the transactional and collective memories of groups.
1.4 Methods
Participants
We recruited 1000 participants using AmazonMechanical Turk, an online labor market where people
perform short computer-based tasks for pay (Berinsky et al., 2012; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Ipeirotis,
2010; Mason & Suri, 2012). Each participant was paid $0.50 for a few minutes of work. Recruitment
and testing was executed in accordance with Harvard University regulations and approved by the
Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research under the Institutional Review Board for the
Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Recruitment was limited to participants based in the US with approval
rates of at least 90%.
Stimuli
The stimulus consisted of a set of 1–12 colorful dots. The dots were arranged in a ring around a small
central fixation point. Each dot appeared in one of twelve locations spaced equally around the ring,
with the constraint that each dot had its own location. Dots were randomly assigned one of 180
equally spaced colors drawn from a circle (radius 59°, center L=54, a=18 and b=–8) cut out from the
cie Lab color space. Stimuli were rendered in a browser. The viewing distance was approximately
50 cm.
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Procedure
The participant pressed the space bar to begin the trial. The stimulus immediately appeared for 250
ms and then disappeared. Participants were asked to remember the colors of the presented dots. The
screen remained blank for the retention interval. Once the waiting period was over, a small cue ap-
peared in the location of one of the dots, selected at random. The participant used the mouse to select
the remembered color of the cued dot. Colors were selected by moving the mouse in a circle around
the center of the display. A dot appeared at the center of the display and was continuously updated
with the currently selected color. Participants registered their selection by clicking. No feedback was
provided. There were ten possible retention intervals (1/32, 1/16, 1/8, 1/4, 1/2, 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 s)
and seven possible memory loads (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 12 objects), for a total of 7 × 10 = 70 test trials.
The order of the trials was randomized so that the participant would not know at the time of encoding
how long they would need to remember the objects. There were 6 practice trials, 1–6 objects in as-
cending order, all with a retention interval of 1 s. There were negligible practice eﬀects during the test
trials, suggesting that our training procedure was suﬃcient for participants to perform the task well
(Fig. 13).
Extracting the empirical forgetting functions
First we excluded participants who showed weak evidence of having faithfully completed the task.
To do this, for each participant, we compared two models of their performance using the Akaike in-
formation criterion. The first model was a two-parameter model (Zhang & Luck, 2008) where with
probability 1   g the participant remembers the stimulus with fixed fidelity σ, the dispersion param-
eter of a vonMises distribution (a circular analogue to the normal distribution), and with proba-
bility g guesses blindly. The other model was a zero-parameter model where the participant always
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guessed blindly. Since our null model— complete guessing for all 76 trials— is so weak, our crite-
rion for inclusion was strict, aicC ≥ 10, which constitutes strong evidence of the presence of mem-
ory (Akaike, 1974). This strict criterion may inadvertently exclude participants with poor working
memory, though the results we find are comparable when relaxing the inclusion criterion to aicC ≥ 3,
which constitutes moderate evidence of memory.
Next, we combined participants’ data into a super-subject. Themain manipulations of time and
load were performed within each subject— one trial per condition per participant— but the analysis
combined the data together. Though this is necessary to achieve suﬃciently precise measurements,
it leaves open the possibility that variability among people in the form of individual diﬀerences will
aﬀect the shape of the measured curves (see later sections). We fit a four-parameter variable-precision
model (Fougnie et al., 2012; van den Berg et al., 2012) to arrive at an estimate of the guess rate g sep-
arately for each duration and load K. The product (1   g)K, the average number of remembered ob-
jects, is plotted in Figures 2, 3, and 5. Analysis was performed usingMemToolbox 1.0.0. (Suchow
et al., 2013).
Estimating mean lifetimes
Mean lifetimes were estimated by fitting an exponential decay model to the raw error data. The ex-
ponential decay model is a time-based generalization of the two-component model described in the
previous section. In the exponential decay model, the number of remembered objects Y falls expo-
nentially with time t, such that Y(t) = β exp(t=τ), where τ is the mean lifetime and β is the number of
encoded objects at t = 0. Memory quality at each duration, as quantified by the dispersion parameter
of the corresponding vonMises distribution, was allowed to vary freely. A loose prior was placed over
each parameter for the purposes of estimation. The prior on βwas uniform over the full range, 0 to
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the number of presented objects. The prior on bias was uniform over the full range, –π to π radians.
The prior on τ was log-normal with a mean of 20 s and a standard deviation of 2 ln units. The prior
on the dispersion parameter of each vonMises distribution was log-normal with a mean of 7.4 and
a standard deviation of 1 ln unit. Themodel was fit with mcmc using Pymc2 version 2.2 (Patil et al.,
2010).
Strength of evidence for crossover
For each possible pairing of tested set sizes, we measured the strength of evidence in favor of a model
where the forgetting function for the greater set size crosses over that for lesser set size (i.e., where it
starts higher and ends lower) to one where it does not cross over. Strength of evidence was measured
using the Bayes factor, the ratio of the posterior odds to the prior odds. The prior odds were 1 : 1. The
prior probabilities on model parameters were the same as in the previous section.
Fitting the evolutionary model to the Yang (1999) data. In Fig. 6, we fit the evolutionary model
to data from Yang (1999)’s experiments on iconic memory (Yang, 1999). Themodel was fit by min-
imizing the squared error between the data and the model’s predictions using Nelder–Mead simplex
search over the model’s parameters (Lagarias et al., 1998) (Appendix A).
1.5 Additional results
In the following subsections, we consider the eﬀects of individual diﬀerences, practice, and diﬀer-
ences between in-lab and online testing.
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1.5.0 Individual differences
People vary considerably in the capacity of their working memory systems, and these individual dif-
ferences are correlated with intelligence, reasoning abilities, and reading comprehension (Unsworth
& Engle, 2005; Daneman &Carpenter, 1980; Fukuda et al., 2010; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). Our
analysis procedure, which combines data frommultiple participants into a single super-subject, masks
such variability, and it is therefore important to consider the ways in which the presence of individual
diﬀerences might impact our results.
First, variability might alter the predictions of the classic, sudden death, or pure death models,
undermining our claim that they fail to capture features of the empirical forgetting curves. Second,
variability might alter the predictions of the proposed evolutionary model, undermining the logic
whereby a tight fit between model and data lends support to the model. We examine each of these
possibilities below.
1.5.1 Individual differences in the classic model
In the classic model, variability can arise through individual diﬀerences in the initial capacity K,
which is the number of structures encoded in working memory. Through simulation, we inject in-
dividual diﬀerences by drawing 1   g, the probability of encoding each object, from a Beta distribu-
tion with parameters chosen to cover a reasonable range of variability. Figure 7 shows that individual
diﬀerences of this sort have no impact on the resulting curves.
1.5.2 Variability in the pure death model
In the pure death model, variability can arise in two ways: through individual diﬀerences in the ini-
tial capacity β, and through individual diﬀerences in the mean lifetime τ. Variability in β is modeled
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Figure 7: Individual differences in the classic model. The bottom row shows histograms of 1–*g*, the proba-
bility of successfully encoding an object in working memory. The top row shows the resulting forgetting func-
tions, averaged over participants. Moving rightward, columns have greater individual differences.
in the same way as it is in the classic model. Through simulation, we inject variability into the mean
lifetime by drawing t from a log normal distribution. Figure 8 shows that variability in β has no impact
on the resulting curves and that variability in τ bends each curve, but does not change the relation-
ship between them, which would be needed to reproduce the eﬀects of load-dependent stability or
crossover.
1.5.3 Variability in the sudden death model
In the sudden death model, variability can arise in three ways: through individual diﬀerences in (1)
the initial capacity β, (2) the mean lifetime τ, and (3) the length of the window of initial stability td.
Variability in β and τ are modeled in the same way as in the classic and pure death models. Through
simulation, we inject variability into td by drawing it from a log normal distribution. As before, vari-
ability in β has no impact on the resulting curves. Figure 9 shows that variability in τ has the same
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Figure 8: Individual differences in the pure death model. The leftmost column shows histograms of 1–g, the
probability of successfully encoding an object in working memory. The bottommost row show histograms of
τ, the mean lifetime. There are nine plots, one for each pair of distributions on 1–g and τ. Moving rightward,
columns have greater individual differences in τ. Moving downward, rows have greater individual differences in
1–g. The y-axis is logarithmic to highlight shifts away from an exponential function (a straight line).
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eﬀects as it does in the pure death model and that variability in td softens the corner occuring at time
points directly before and after the cutoﬀ. As with the pure death model, these individual diﬀerences
change the shape of the curves, but do not impact the relationship between them.
1.5.4 Variability in the evolutionary model
In the proposed evolutionary model, variability can arise in three ways: through individual diﬀer-
ences in (1) the number of quantaN; (2) the duration of one time step tstep, or (3) the stability
threshold s. Through simulation, we inject variability into each parameter and observe the eﬀects
on the predicted forgetting functions. DrawingN from a (discretized) normal distribution, we find
that individual diﬀerences have a greater benefit to high memory loads than to low loads, thereby
leading to a slight weakening of the crossover eﬀect and load-dependent stability (Fig. 9). However,
a crossover is seen even with high levels of individual diﬀerences (sd of 2 ln units). Next, drawing
the stability threshold from a discrete uniform distribution, we again find that individual diﬀerences
have a greater benefit to high memory loads than to low loads, with considerably less crossover, but
only a miniscule eﬀect on the presence of load-dependent stability (Fig. 10). Lastly, drawing tstep
from a log normal distribution, we once again find the same result, with slight weakening of both
load-dependent stability and crossover (Fig. 10). Together, these results suggest that the predictions
of the proposed evolutionary model are tolerant to large individual diﬀerences inN, moderate indi-
vidual diﬀerences in k, and large individual diﬀerences in tstep.
1.5.5 The effects of practice
Here, we consider the eﬀects of practice by tracking performance as it changes over the course of the
experiment’s 70 trials (Fig. 13). The number of remembered objects dropped slightly (linear corre-
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Figure 9: Individual differences in the sudden death model. The leftmost column shows histograms of tdeath,
the probability of successfully encoding an object in working memory. The bottommost row show histograms
of τ, the mean lifetime. There are nine plots, one for each pair of distributions on tdeath and τ. Moving right-
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lation, r=–0.30, p = 0.013), roughly 0.01% per trial (slope of linear regression, –0.002 object/trial;
intercept, 2.2 objects). There were no significant changes in memory quality (r=0.15, p=0.22) or bias
(r=0.03, p = 0.81). This suggests that our training procedure was suﬃcient for participants to perform
the task well.
1.5.6 Laboratory replication
We performed an in-laboratory replication of the main experiment in a group of six naive participants.
The task used loads 1, 2, 3, and 6, and durations 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 4, and 10 s. Participants were each
tested for 6-8 sessions of 360 trials, 15 trials per condition (pairing of duration and memory load),
in random order. We observe similar results of load-dependent forgetting and overreaching, with a
crossover for the highest load.
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Figure 13: The effects of practice. Each subplots shows changes in performance as a function of trial num-
ber. The upper plot shows changes in the number of remembered objects. The middle plot shows changes in
memory quality (lower is better). The lower plot shows changes in bias.
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Figure 14: Replication in the lab. We replicated the online experiments in the lab with a group of six partici-
pants. The tested memory loads were 1, 2, 3, and 6. The tested durations were 0.125, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 4, and 10
s. Participants were each tested for 6-8 sessions of 360 trials, 15 trials per condition (pairing of duration and
memory load), in random order. Data were fit with a hierarchical version of the 2-component model of Zhang
& Luck (Zhang & Luck, 2008). The plotted data is the population mean. Data were fit using the MemToolbox
1.0.0. (Suchow et al., 2013)
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2
Looking inwards and back: realtimemonitoring
of visual workingmemories
2.0 Abstract
Confidence in our memories is influenced by many factors, including beliefs about the perceptibil-
ity or memorability of certain kinds of objects and events, as well as knowledge about our skill sets,
habits, and experiences. Notoriously, our knowledge and beliefs about memory can lead us astray,
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causing us to be overly confident in eyewitness testimony or to overestimate the frequency of recent
experiences. Here, using visual working memory as a case study, we designed a task that strips away
all these potentially misleading cues, requiring observers to make confidence judgments by directly
assessing the quality of their memory representations. We show that individuals can monitor the sta-
tus of a memory as it degrades over time. Our findings suggest that people have access to information
reflecting the existence and quality of their memories, and furthermore, that they can use this infor-
mation to guide their behavior.
2.1 Introduction
metamemory is an awareness of our memories and the systems that store them. We use metamem-
ory to determine that we are uncertain (“I can’t remember where I parked my car”), to ask for a re-
minder (“When’s that appointment, again?”), and to form beliefs about our ability to remember
certain kinds of information (“I’m good with names”) (Flavell &Wellman, 1977). For better or
for worse, judgments of confidence in our memories are influenced by many factors. These include
general knowledge in the form of beliefs about ourselves and what we find memorable, as well as
more specific knowledge derived from our previous experience with the task at hand (Koriat, 1997;
Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz et al., 1997). However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying metamemory
judgments are poorly understood.
Looking towards research in other areas of metacognition, where a variety of confidence mech-
anisms have been explored in detail, may provide a clue about the workings of metamemory. For
example, in the case of perceptual discriminations, one simple mechanism for judging confidence is
to use visual cues associated with uncertainty (e.g. faintness and blur), alone or in combination, as a
proxy for confidence (Barthelmé &Mamassian, 2010). Then, when asked to identify an object that
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appears blurry or faint, an observer using this mechanism will report having low confidence because
blurriness and faintness are stimulus features typically associated with uncertainty. Importantly, cue-
based mechanisms like this one draw on static information about the stimulus and decision-maker,
rather than directly accessing an internal representation or decision making process. In contrast, an
alternative class of mechanisms has been proposed that can compute realtime measures of perceptual
confidence (Kepecs et al., 2008). Realtime mechanisms are notable because, rather than relying on
externally observed cues, they monitor internal states as they change over time (Kepecs et al., 2008).
These monitored states may be those of decision variables associated with the task, or those of un-
derlying representations that store uncertainty explicitly— e.g., as probability distributions over past
states of the environment (Barthelmé &Mamassian, 2010).
Here, using visual working memory as a case study, we designed a test to isolate realtime mecha-
nisms underlying the evaluation of confidence in memory. Our task was a variant of a popular test
of visual working memory in which participants view a display of colorful dots and then, shortly
thereafter, report the color of a dot selected for them at random (Wilken &Ma, 2004). In our variant,
however, instead of requiring participants always to report the color of a randomly selected dot (“ran-
dom” condition), they were sometimes aﬀorded the opportunity to report the color of the object
they remembered best (“best” condition). Choosing the best-remembered object requires an inward-
looking comparison of the relative quality of multiple memories, and is a within-trial analogue to
the opt-out procedure used extensively in studies of human and animal metacognition (Smith et al.,
1995, 1997; Tanaka & Funahashi, 2012). To strip away nearly all the usual sources of metamemory
information— general knowledge, stimulus-based cues, and time-based fluctuations in attention and
arousal—we compared memory for an object in a display when it was chosen by the participant as
their best remembered object to when it was chosen by the experimenter at random. This procedure
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enables us to isolate a form of monitoring whereby an individual tracks the status of a memory as it
degrades over time.
2.2 Methods
2.2.0 Logic of the task: isolating realtime monitoring
Participants were asked to remember the colors of a set of colorful dots, and then either to report the
color of a randomly selected dot, or to make an inward-looking decision by choosing the dot they
remembered best and reporting its color. Because our goal was to isolate the contribution of realtime
monitoring to this decision, the experimental procedure combined multiple techniques to eliminate
confounding sources of metamemory cues:
Stimulus-based cues. Of principal interest was whether memory would be more accurate for the
best-remembered object than for a randomly selected item. However, the best-remembered object
might be preferred for reasons that do not require a realtime assessment of memory quality. For ex-
ample, a participant may prefer a particular color (say, red), and pay more attention to it. Or perhaps
they find it more memorable, preferring to select red objects whenever the chance arises (e.g., see
Morey, 2011). This is a form of metamemory, but it does not reflect realtime monitoring.
To eliminate display factors such as these, we used a double-pass procedure (Burgess & Colborne,
1988; Gold et al., 2005; Green, 1964) where participants are asked to remember the same display
(i.e., a particular color and arrangement of dots) multiple times. We then compare memory perfor-
mance for a particular object when it was randomly selected by the experimenter versus when it was
chosen by the participant as the object that was best remembered. Any advantage for the preferred
object is thus unlikely to depend on stimulus-based factors, which are held constant across the condi-
tions.
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Tradeoﬀs in encoding or maintenance. When viewing the stimulus, a participant’s attention might
wander due to either an explicit strategy or accidental drift, causing one object to be encoded more
vigorously than another. This could also happen during maintenance, shifting priority from one ob-
ject to another after the stimulus has already disappeared. These imbalances, if known to the partici-
pant, could be used as a proxy for memory fidelity because an ignored object is unlikely to be remem-
bered well. To avoid this, our approach was to design the experiment to minimize tradeoﬀs and then
to perform a separate tradeoﬀ detection procedure once the experiment was over.
Our design interleaved two diﬀerent types of trials in random order. On half of the trials, partici-
pants reported the color of the dot they remembered best, while on the other half, they reported the
color of a dot selected at random by the experimenter. Interleaving the trial types encourages partici-
pants to remember all the dots, because they do not know which dot will be tested.
This procedure mitigates the tradeoﬀs, but it is possible that tradeoﬀs were still present. To de-
termine this, we used an additional tradeoﬀ detection procedure: After reporting either the best-
remembered object or a randomly selected one, the participant was then asked to report the color of a
second dot on the display, selected at random. These two reports are used together to detect tradeoﬀs
with the detection procedure introduced in Fougnie et al. (2012), which relies on the fact that trade-
oﬀs introduce dependencies in the measured quality of representations of objects on a display: if one
object is remembered particularly well, it comes at the expense of the others. Therefore, the detection
procedure compares performance for the first-reported object in two conditions: where the absolute
error for the second-reported item was (1) above or (2) below the median absolute error across all
second reports. A tradeoﬀ is revealed by first reports being more accurate when second reports are
worse. The tradeoﬀ analysis was limited to trials where the first object was randomly selected to avoid
the dependency introduced by the participant’s selection.
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Fluctuations in attention or arousal. Attention, arousal, and eﬀort can fluctuate frommoment to
moment (Kahneman, 1973). Most studies of metamemory ask for ratings or judgments about a par-
ticular memory at a particular moment, and so momentary fluctuations can aﬀect performance and
therefore contribute to metamemory decisions. In our task, we asked participants to make a relative
judgment about the quality of simultaneously held memories, such that the confidence judgment
could never depend on the overall state of attention or arousal, which would apply equally to all ob-
jects on the display. Similarly, we randomized the order of the two trial types, which prevents mo-
mentary fluctuations from systematically aﬀecting one trial type over the other.
2.2.1 Implementation of the task
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Figure 15: Timeline of one trial of the double-pass metamemory task. First, the participant sees a set of col-
orful dots and is asked to remember them for 900 ms (a–c). Then the type of trial is revealed: the participant
will either choose, reporting the object they remember best (d, top, “best”), or mandatorily report the object
highlighted for them (d, bottom, “random”). These two trial types are interleaved in random order. Thus the
participant does not know the trial type until it is revealed in panel (d). Therefore the participant must encode
all the items. Once the trial type is revealed, the participant reports the color by selecting it from the color
wheel (e). A different item is then selected at random (g) and the participant reports its color (h). This second
report is later used in an assay of strategic or accidental trade-offs (see Methods and Supplemental Infor-
mation). Finally, the participant receives feedback (i). These steps, which constitute one trial, are repeated
hundreds of times in two rounds. In the second round, the displays used in the two conditions (“best” or “ran-
dom”) are swapped, producing a double-pass procedure where, unbeknownst to the participant, in the second
round the “randomly” chosen objects are in fact those chosen by the participant in the first round.
At the beginning of each trial, the participant fixated a small dot in the center of the screen. Then
the stimulus (a set of three colorful dots) appeared for 600 ms. Next, the trial type was revealed to
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the participant through a display that contained a cue in each of the locations of the test objects. If it
was a trial where the participant was asked to report a specific object, that object was highlighted as a
filled circle among open circles. On the other hand, if it was a trial where the participant reported the
best-remembered object, all the objects appeared filled in. Then a color wheel with all the possible
colors appeared and the color of the best-remembered object was reported. Finally, the participant
used a mouse-controlled cursor to select which object was best remembered. After this first report,
the participant was asked to report the color of a second object selected at random from the two that
remained. The reporting procedure was the same. Feedback was provided at the end of each trial. The
feedback screen, which appeared for 1000 ms, showed the actual color (inner ring) and the reported
color (outer ring) for both of the tested objects (Fig. 1i).
2.2.2 Stimuli and presentation
Each dot had a radius of 0.4° of visual angle. The dots were arranged in a ring with a radius of 3.8° and
centered on the display. The color of each dot was drawn uniformly from a circle cut out of the cie
1976 L*a*b* color space, centered at L = 54, a = 18, b = –8, with the constraint that the magnitude
of each display’s mean hue vector was 0.35. This decreases grouping cues and reduces imbalances in
appearance across displays. After the stimulus disappeared, there was a 900 ms retention interval.
Stimuli were rendered by matlab with the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997), and
presented on a 1920 1200 lcd screen at 60 Hz, 38 pixel/cm, positioned 60 cm from the partici-
pant.
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2.2.3 Participants
Twelve people between the ages of 18 and 31 participated. They all had normal or corrected-to-
normal visual acuity. The protocol, approved by the Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in
Research under the Institutional Review Board for the Faculty of Arts & Sciences, was carried out in
accordance with the provisions of theWorldMedical Association Declaration of Helinski.
2.2.4 Data analysis
To quantify memory performance, for each participant and condition we separately fit a variable-
precision model to the data (Fougnie et al., 2012; van den Berg et al., 2012). This model supposes
that each object on the display is either remembered or forgotten, and that the quality with which
objects are remembered can vary. Specifically, the variable-precision model assumes that objects are
remembered with some probability, and that if remembered, errors in recall are distributed according
to a vonMises distribution centered around zero (though perhaps with some bias) and whose spread
(s.d.), a measure of memory fidelity, is itself distributed according to some higher-order distribution,
assumed here to be a zero-truncated normal.
We also considered a simpler fixed-precision model that did not allowmemory quality to vary, as
well as an extension to it that allows for the possibility that the participant will “swap” items, erro-
neously reporting an item that was not the target (Bays et al., 2009). Analysis was performed with
MemToolbox 1.0.0 (Suchow et al., 2013). Analysis scripts and data are available as Supplementary
Material.
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2.3 Results
We found that participants can use realtime monitoring to make metamemory judgments. Figure 2
shows estimates of guessing rate (left panel) and precision (middle panel), averaged across partici-
pants. Individual participant results are shown (right panel) for items that were chosen as the best
remembered (circles) versus those same items when they were selected at random (squares). Ob-
servers performed better in both guessing rate and memory precision when they chose to report the
object, versus when the object was randomly selected. When asked to report the color of the best-
remembered object, participants remembered it 92±2% (mean ± sem) of the time and with fidelity
of 20.8±1°. When those same displays were presented in the second session and participants were
forced to report the same object that they had previously picked, they performed worse, remember-
ing it 71±3% of the time and with a fidelity of 23.8±2° (paired samples t-test, t(11) = 7.5, p = 1.2
10–5 and t(11) = –2.5, p = 0.03, respectively). This worsening across exposures happened despite
overall performance being comparable in the two rounds (diﬀerence of 0.6° in fidelity from the first
to second round, paired samples t-test, t(11) = 0.51, p = 0.62; diﬀerence of 0.4% in guess rate, paired
samples t-test, t(11) = 0.14, p = 0.89).
Using the trade-oﬀ detection procedure described inMethods, we tested for trade-oﬀs in the en-
coding or maintenance of items, but found none (guess rate for above vs. belowmedian split: 20.5
vs. 19.4%, paired sample t-test, t(11) = –0.68, p = 0.51; fidelity: 22.1° vs. 22.4°, t(11) = 0.42, p = 0.68).
We performed additional analyses to determine whether our results are robust to assumptions
about the structure of visual memory representations. Specifically, we repeated the above analysis
using three other models: the two-component mixture model introduced by Zhang & Luck (2008),
the “swap” model introduced by Bays et al. (2009), and a one-component model without guessing.
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Figure 16: The contribution of realtime monitoring to judgments of confidence in memory. We compare per-
formance across two conditions, one where the participant selects an item as the one that was best remem-
bered from that display (squares), and another where the participant reports that same item because they
were required to (circles). They performed better when they made the choice, which implies that participants
can use realtime monitoring to guide their selections in the task, picking out the one they remember best.
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2.3.0 Results: Two-component mixture model
We considered a two-component model without variability in precision. When asked to report the
color of the best remembered item, participants remembered it 91±2% (mean ± sem) of the time
and with a fidelity of 20.5±1° (Fig. S1). When those same displays were presented in the second
session and participants were forced to report the same item that they had previously picked, they
performed worse, remembering it 68±4% of the time and with a fidelity of 22.3±1° (paired samples
t-test, t(11) = 6.8, p = 2.8 10–5 and t(11) = –2.7, p = 0.02, respectively). This across-exposure wors-
ening happened despite the presence of small practice eﬀects, which caused performance for the best-
remembered items to improve from the first session to the second (a gain of 1.8° in fidelity, paired
samples t-test, t(11) = 2.12, p = 0.0572; an insignificant 0.014 improvement in guess rate, paired sam-
ples t-test, t(11) = 0.70, p = 0.50). No tradeoﬀs were detected (guess rate for first object according
to whether absolute error on second object was above vs. belowmedian: 0.36 vs. 0.34, paired sam-
ple t-test, t(11) = –0.77, p = 0.46; fidelity: 23.8° vs. 25.0°, t(11) = 0.62, p = 0.55). Analysis included a
bias parameter; its value did not diﬀer significantly between the conditions (-0.47° vs. –0.48°, t(11) =
-0.02, p = 0.99).
2.3.1 Results: Adding a swap component
When asked to report the color of the best-remembered item, participants remembered it 93±2%
(mean ± sem) of the time and with a fidelity of 20.4±1° (Fig. S1a). When those same displays were
presented in the second session, they performed worse, remembering the item 70±4% of the time and
with a fidelity of 22.2±1.1° (paired samples t-test, t(11) = –6.8, p = 2.8 10–5 and t(11) = –2.4, p =
0.03, respectively). The swap rate, the probability of mistakenly reporting one of the uncued objects
instead of the target, was 2% in both conditions and was no better for the best-remembered object
50
Guess rate
St
an
da
rd
 d
ev
iat
io
n 
(d
eg
)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Random, average
Best, average
Random, individual
Best, individual
Figure 17: Comparing performance in the random probe and choose-the-best conditions. Performance is ana-
lyzed using the two-component model of Zhang & Luck (2008).
(paired samples t-test, t(11) = –0.06, p = 0.95). The swap rates observed here, which are roughly
three times lower than those measured in a previous study using similar methods (Bays et al., 2009),
is perhaps due to diﬀerences in stimuli. Specifically, our stimuli were generated with a procedure that
reduced grouping of similar colors (see Methods), which is likely to be a major contributor to swap
errors. Analysis included a bias parameter; its value did not diﬀer significantly between the condi-
tions (–0.36° vs. –0.54°, t(11) = 0.27, p = 0.79).
2.3.2 Results: No guessing
When asked to report the color of the best-remembered item, participants remembered the item with
a fidelity of 31±1° (Fig. S2). When those same displays were presented in the second session and
participants were forced to report the same item that they had previously picked, they performed
worse, remembering the item with a fidelity of 54±1° (paired samples t-test, t(11) = –8.3, p = 4.5
10–6). Analysis included a bias parameter; its value did not diﬀer significantly between the conditions
(–0.54° vs. –0.98°, t(11) = 0.29, p = 0.78).
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lyzed using a model without guessing.
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2.4 Discussion
The results of this experiment suggest that realtime monitoring can be used to make judgments of
confidence in working memory. We found that participants remembered an object’s color more ac-
curately when it had been chosen as the one they remembered best than when that same object, pre-
sented in the context of the same display, was selected at random by the experimenter. Even after
eliminating other sources of metamemory information, such as stimulus-based cues and tradeoﬀs in
encoding and maintenance, we found that observers were able to assess the quality of their memories
in realtime and could use that information to guide their behavior. Thus, the present results reveal a
strategy that can monitor both the existence and quality of representations in visual working mem-
ory.
This form of metamemory requires access to information that indexes the quality of memories.
Though it is unclear what mechanism provides realtime access to memories, research on uncertainty
in decision making may provide a clue:
A number of simple mechanisms have been proposed that might support realtime measures of
confidence in perceptual judgments (Kepecs et al., 2008). These mechanisms involve accessing deci-
sion variables that contribute to a decision. For example, in a race model, where evidence simultane-
ously accumulates for each alternative choice (Gold & Shadlen, 2007), confidence can be estimated
by measuring the diﬀerence in accumulated evidence for each alternative at the moment the choice is
made. High confidence is appropriate when there is a big imbalance in accumulated evidence. Anal-
ogous mechanisms may be at play in the monitoring of visual working memories. For example, con-
fidence in a memory could be computed by comparing the accumulated evidence for the winning
decision (i.e., stimulus value) to the average of the others. Alternatively, monitoring may be accom-
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plished through more indirect means, using a process akin to an availability heuristic. Suppose, for
instance, that less precise memories are more diﬃcult to access (e.g., see Brady et al., 2013). Then,
the participant can use a metamemory routine that attempts to access a memory and terminates if
nothing has been accessed after a fixed amount of time. The time to access then serves as a proxy for
memory fidelity and can be used to inform confidence.
Whatever the mechanismmight be, the present results demonstrate it is possible to access the cur-
rent state of a memory and to use that information to guide behavior. The existence of realtime mon-
itoring mechanisms has important implications not only for our understanding of metamemory, but
also for theories of the representational format of visual working memory. Leading models of visual
working memory assume that memory limits are determined purely by the availability of a limited
commodity: once you run out of memory slots (Awh et al., 2007; Zhang & Luck, 2008; Luck & Vo-
gel, 2013) or memory resources (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Bays et al., 2009; Wilken &Ma, 2004;
Ma et al., 2014), you can no longer store additional objects in memory. However, in addition to pos-
sible commodity-based limits, there is emerging evidence that visual working memory is also limited
by interference, degradation, or decay that leads to the gradual loss of information over time (Fougnie
et al., 2013). This decrease in quality appears to reflect a process that operates independently across
items (Fougnie et al., 2013). Such degradation leads to substantial variability in the quality of memo-
ries across objects, with some objects remembered very well, others remembered poorly, and others
completely forgotten. The present results provide evidence for the presence of variability in mem-
ory quality (Fougnie et al., 2012; van den Berg et al., 2012) and show that this variability cannot be
explained by stimulus diﬀerences or by diﬀerential allocation of attention within or across trials.
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2.5 Conclusion
Most research on metacognition has focused on perception and long-termmemory, exploring how
people assess uncertainty about their current perceptions and distant memories. Theories of metamem-
ory have thus focused on howmultiple sources of information influence judgments of confidence,
including several static factors such as howmemorable the material is, or judgments about our own
abilities. Thus, it has been diﬃcult to assess whether and how participants have access to information
that directly indexes the quality of a memory. In the present study, we developed a newmethod to
strip away these static factors, enabling us to isolate realtime metamemory mechanisms, taking ad-
vantage of the fact that working memories appear to degrade stochastically over time. We found that
observers appear to have access to the current state of their memories, and can use that information
to guide their behavior in an ongoing task. These findings open the door to new explorations into the
nature of the cues that enable realtime memory monitoring and into the impact of metamemory in
complex cognitive processes that rely on working memory.
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3
Controlling workingmemorymaintenance
Memories can be remembered and forgotten intentionally through the process of directed
forgetting and directed remembering, which prioritize some experiences over others for later access
(Muther, 1965; Bjork et al., 1968). These directed processes are closely related to cognitive control
and to the top-down processes that determine our conscious thoughts frommoment to moment
(Macrae et al., 1997). At times, these control processes can backfire, causing unwanted thoughts and
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memories to linger despite our best intentions (Wegner, 2009).
One of the clearest demonstrations of directed remembering in short term visual memory comes
from recent work byWilliams et al. (2012). In the study, participants performed a task in which they
were asked to remember the colors of one or two colorful squares. On trials when two objects were
presented, a cue would sometimes appear 1 s into the retention interval, informing the participant of
which object would be tested a few seconds later. This hint aﬀorded participants the opportunity to
alter their maintenance behavior accordingly (Fig. 20). Williams et al. found that participants per-
formed better when the cue was present than when it was absent: the probability of remembering the
tested object increased from 85% to 91% and fidelity improved from 12.5° to 10.0° (Fig. 21). These
results show that visual memory maintenance is flexible— it can be shifted, prioritizing one stored
representation over another.
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Figure 20: Method for revealing directed remembering in visual working memory (Williams et al., 2012).
There are three conditions. In condition 1, one object is presented. In condition 2, two objects are presented. In
condition 20, two objects are presented and the tested object is cued early in the retention interval.
Directed remembering is one kind of flexible maintenance behavior, but other kinds are possible,
too. Specifically, the results of Chapter 2, in which we showed that people can use metamemory to
access the current strength of their visual memories, suggest the possibility of maintenance strategies
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Figure 21: Directed remembering in visual working memory. The probability of remembering the tested object
is highest when there is only one object (1), lower when there are two but one of them is cued (20), and even
lower when there are two but none is cued (2). (Right) Fidelity shows the same pattern of results (NB: here, a
lower standard deviation means better performance). Data is replotted from (Williams et al., 2012).
that make use of metamemory. For example, one strategy that uses metamemory targets the weak-
est accessible memory. Another gives preference to memories that are already strongly represented.
These are just two of many such maintenance strategies that make use of metamemory to guide main-
tenance. What is the space of possible maintenance strategies, and how successful is each of them in
retaining visual information over short durations?
One factor aﬀecting that success is the cost of directed maintenance: prioritizing one representa-
tion means neglecting others. This trade-oﬀ can be observed by comparing performance for priori-
tized vs. neglected representations (e.g., see Fig. 21). However, the results of Chapter 1 predict that
there will also be a second cost associated with direct maintenance. Specifically, in Chapter 1 it was
proposed that maintenance is limited by a stability threshold, such that only memory representations
with a strength that surpasses the threshold are accessible to the maintenance process and can re-
ceive its benefits. Memory representations that are too weak can not be maintained. The second cost
derives from this stability threshold: redistributing maintenance brings the neglected objects closer
to the edge. This cost would be apparent when comparing the overall eﬃciency of directed remem-
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bering across loads. Specifically, when there are few objects to maintain, there should be a relatively
eﬃcient trade-oﬀ between objects, such that the overall amount that is remembered remains con-
stant, only being shifted from one object to another. However, as the number of objects increases, ef-
ficiency should drop because the act of shifting maintenance brings neglected representations closer
and closer to the stability threshold and thus more susceptible to total loss.
The goal of this work is to define the space of possible maintenance strategies, considering both
the constraints (e.g., the stability threshold) and the sources of information that are available (e.g.,
metamemory). In light of this goal, the plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 1 presents an ex-
periment on the eﬃciency of directed remembering, showing that this eﬃciency depends on load.
Section 2 presents an experiment on self-directed remembering, in which a person uses metamemory
to guide selection of the target of maintenance. Section 3 describes a formal framework, the Markov
decision process, which is useful for describing sequential decision making and will allow us to define
the space of possible maintenance strategies and to specify the minimal mechanisms needed to pro-
duce the flexible maintenance behaviors that were observed. The section then presents two classes of
maintenance policies— conditional and unconditional— and shows how conditional policies can
produce directed and self-directed remembering. Finally, it extends the model to cases of imperfect
metamemory, describing memory maintenance in a partially observable mind – i.e., situations when
the maintenance system has incomplete or uncertain information about the current status of actively
held memories.
3.1 Exp. 1: Efficiency of directed remembering
In the experiment that follows, we tested the prediction that the eﬃciency of directed remembering
decreases with load. Participants performed a directed remembering task. We manipulated whether
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the cue was present and whether it was valid— faithfully indicating which object would later be
tested. We also manipulated load. The undirected condition (no cue) provides the baseline measure-
ment of howmuch is remembered by default. The prioritized (i.e., validly-cued) and neglected (i.e.
invalidly-cued) conditions allow us to measure howmuch is remembered when maintenance is di-
rected. We use these measurements to compute the eﬃciency of directed remembering, which is the
proportion of information remembered in the undirected task that is remembered when maintenance
is directed.
3.1.1 Methods
Participants
Eight people between the ages of 18 and 26 participated. They all had normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity, normal color vision, and were naive to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli
Stimuli were 1, 2, 3, or 4 cubes. Each cube had three visible sides, one white, one grey, and one black,
viewed either from above or below. There were thus twelve configurations (Fig. 22). Cubes were
positioned 5° above, below, to the left of, or to the right of a central fixation mark. Stimuli are adapted
from Alvarez & Cavanagh (2004).
Procedure
After receiving instructions, the participant initiated the experiment by clicking a mouse. On each
trial, the objects appeared for 300 ms and then disappeared. The retention interval was 2.80 seconds.
On half of the trials, a cue appeared 0.600 s into the trial. The cue was a small grey dot (0.1 deg of vi-
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sual angle) flashed in the location of one of the cubes. The cue was valid on 75% of trials. On valid
trials, the cued cube was always tested. On invalid trials, the tested cube was chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from the other (non-cued) cubes. The tested cube’s location was marked with a small cue, iden-
tical to the one that was presented during the retention interval. Two hundred milliseconds after this
cue, a response screen containing all 12 possible cubes appeared. The participant selected the cube
that they remembered having seen in the location that was tested. Selecting a response automatically
initiated the next trial. No feedback was provided.
Analysis
We compare the eﬃciency of directed remembering across diﬀerent loads. Eﬃciency is measured as
the proportion of the number of objects (or features) remembered in an undirected setting that are
remembered in a directed setting. Eﬃcient directed remembering happens when the participant is
able to shift the balance of memory maintenance at whim while maintaining the same total amount
of information that they would have had they not shifted maintenance at all. Ineﬃcient directed re-
membering happens when shifting the balance comes at the cost of fewer remembered objects (or
features) in total. For example, if the participant remembers 2 of 4 objects in an undirected setting,
but only 1 of 4 in a directed setting, that participant’s eﬃciency is 1/2.
Figure 22: Cubes used in the directed remembering experiment.
Measuring eﬃciency requires converting performance on the task to a measure of howmuch was
remembered. The specific conversion that is used depends on one’s model of how participants store
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memories. Themost popular conversion assumes that the participant remembers k objects. If the
tested object is among those that are remembered, the participant responds correctly. Otherwise the
participant guesses blindly. This conversion assumes a “high-threshold” model of memory— either
the participant remembers enough about the particular object to report it correctly, or they remem-
ber nothing about it at all (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Cowan, 2001; Rouder et al., 2008). Perfomance on
the task is linear in k. It is also possible to relax this assumption by assuming that participants have
graded memories of the presented objects. We suppose that the participant remembers each feature
with some probability p; the participant responds by selecting randomly from among all possibilities
that are consistent with what is stored in memory. Under these assumptions, we find that task perfor-
mance is approximately linear in p (Fig. 23), such that eﬃciency measurements based either on the
number of stored objects or on the number of stored features will be similar.
The eﬃciency of directed remembering is thus defined as the ratio kU=(kP + kN), where kU, kP,
and kN are the number of remembered objects in the undirected, prioritized (i.e., validly-cued) and
neglected (i.e., invalidly-cued) conditions, respectively. The value of k is given by
k = L

P  1=c
1  1=c

; (3.1)
where L is the load, c is the number of alternatives (i.e., possible cubes, here 12), and P is proportion
correct on the task.
3.1.2 Results
Fig. 24 shows overall performance on the directed remembering task under various loads. As ex-
pected from previous studies, performance is best when there is only one object and declines with
increasing load. A 4 3 repeated measures anova was run with load (1, 2, 3, or 4 cubes) and di-
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Figure 23: Task performance as a function of the probability of remembering each feature. Each point is the
result of simulating 100,000 trials under the assumptions in the main text.
rectedness (neglected, undirected, or directed) as factors. There was a main eﬀect of load (F(1,11) =
14.08, p < 0.01). Performance is nearly perfect (96% correct) when there is only one object, confirm-
ing that participants were attentive during the task. Estimates of capacity were roughly 0.9 across the
whole task. Though these capacity estimates are uncharacteristically low for simple objects such as
colorful squares and familiar shapes, they are typical of highly complex or unfamiliar objects (Alvarez
& Cavanagh, 2004).
Critically, we find that the eﬃciency of directed remembering decreases as the load increases
(Fig. 25). Eﬃciency was lower with 4 objects than with 3 (paired t-test, t(7) = 3.0, p = 0.02) and
lower with 3 objects than with 2 (paired t-test, t(7) = 4:6, p = 0.001), declining from 0.87 to 0.55.
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greater than one. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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3.1.3 Interim discussion
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the eﬃciency of directed remembering depends on the
memory load, revealing a second cost associated with directed maintenance. When multiple objects
are held in mind, the act of biasing maintenance towards one of them is more detrimental to the oth-
ers if there are many objects rather than only one or two. Our account of this eﬀect lies in a stability
threshold that governs memory maintenance. The greater the load, the weaker the individual mem-
ory. Thus at greater loads, directing maintenance away from a representation (and thus allowing it to
weaken further) makes it more likely that it will cross the threshold of inaccessibility.
The drop in eﬃciency with load has implications for the selection of maintenance strategies that
are well suited to a given task. When one representation is known to be the only one that will be rele-
vant to future behavior, directing maintenance to it fully is the most sensible thing to do because the
aforementioned costs are irrelevant— they aﬀect only the neglected representations, not the one
that is prioritized. However, when there is uncertainty about what information will be relevant to fu-
ture behavior, both costs become relevant and it becomes sensible to weigh the benefits of directing
maintenance towards the representations mostly likely to be useful against the costs of worsening the
neglected representations and remembering less in total.
3.2 Exp. 2: Self-directed remembering
Experiment 1 introduced a constraint on directed remembering: its eﬃciency is limited by the num-
ber of objects over which maintenance operates. The eﬀectiveness of memory maintenance also
depends on the kinds of information that are available to it. Certain kinds of information, such as
metamemory, can in principle be used to direct maintenance and to help people to remember more.
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For example, prioritizing the representation that is currently weakest may promote remembering
many weak representations. In contrast, prioritizing the representation that is currently strongest
may promote remembering a small number of strong representations. Can participants use the rel-
ative strength of memories as a cue for what to prioritize, selectively maintaining the best- or worst-
remembered object?
In this experiment, we extend the phenomenon of directed remembering beyond external cues.
Specifically, we asked participants to engage in self-directed remembering— shifting the balance of
memory maintenance according to an internally measured metamemory signal. This is accomplished
by generalizing the directed remembering paradigm to include an internally generated direction, with
a cue informing participants that at the end of the trial they will report the color of whichever ob-
ject is remembered best. There are thus four conditions. In condition ǉ, a cue appears at the end of
the retention interval, telling the participant which object to report. This is the usual partial report
paradigm, used in Chapter 2. In condition Ǌ, a cue appears at the end of the retention interval telling
the participant to report the best-remembered object. This is a simplified version of the metamemory
paradigm used in Chapter 1. In condition ǋ, a cue appears early in the retention interval, again telling
the participant which object to report the color of. This is the directed remembering paradigm. Fi-
nally, in condition ǌ, a cue appears early in the retention interval telling the participant to report the
best-remembered object. This is a test of self-directed remembering. The experiment is thus a 2 2
design: an early vs. late cue to a random vs. the best-remembered object.
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3.2.1 Methods
Participants
Eight people between the ages of 18 and 25 participated. They all had normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity, normal color vision, and were naive to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli
The stimulus was four colorful dots (radius 0.4° of visual angle), arranged in a circle centered on the
display, with each object 4° from the center. At the center was a small black fixation mark. The color
of each dot was drawn uniformly from a circle cut out of the cie 1976 L*a*b* color space, centered at
L = 54, a = 18, b = –8. Stimuli were rendered by matlab with the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007), and presented on a 1920 1200 lcd screen at 60 Hz, 38 pix-
el/cm, positioned 60 cm from the participant.
Procedure
A schematic diagram of the procedure is found in Fig. 26 on pg. 70. Each trial began with a blank
screen, followed by the presentation of the stimulus for 250 ms. There was then a 1000 ms retention
interval with a blank screen. In conditions with an early cue, the cue then appeared for 250 ms. Oth-
erwise the screen remained blank for the same amount of time. In all conditions there was then a
4000 ms retention interval. Then, in conditions with a late cue, the cue appeared for 250 ms. Other-
wise the screen remained blank for the same amount of time. After a 250 ms blank period, on every
trial the participant then reported the color of the appropriate object and its location.
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Analysis
For each condition, we separately fit a hierarchical model to the data from all the participants. The
model assumes that errors are distributed according to a circular normal distribution centered around
0 deg with a standard deviation that is normally distributed in the population. Themodel was fit to
the data usingMemToolbox 1.0.0 (Suchow et al., 2013).
3.2.2 Results
Fig. 27 compares performance on the memory task across the four conditions. Two comparisons are
critical:
First, comparing early cues for the best vs. random condition replicates the basic metamemory re-
sult from Chapter 1 and a previous publication (Fougnie et al., 2012). Performance was better for the
best-remembered object than for a randomly chosen object (early cue: 42 6° vs. 31 7°, standard
error, paired t-test, t(7) = 5.8, p = 6.310 4; late cue: 53 18° vs. 35 8°, standard error, paired
t-test, t(7) = 3.9, p = 0.006). This confirms that participants are successfully using metamemory to
guide selection of structures from working memory.
Second, comparing early vs. late cues for the best-remembered condition provides a test of self-
directed remembering. We found that performance was better with an early cue (s.d. 30.9°) than with
a late cue (s.d. 35.0°; paired t-test, t(7) = –4.6, p = 0.002; Fig. 27).
3.2.3 Interim discussion
Experiment 2 elaborated directed remembering to include internally-generated cues derived from
metamemory— “self-directed remembering”. We found that people were able to direct maintenance
to the representation that was currently remembered best, preferentially maintaining it.
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Figure 26 (following page): Experimental design for a test of self-directed remembering in visual working mem-
ory. The screen starts out empty, with a small fixation dot in the center (a). In (b–c), four objects are briefly
presented and then removed. Then a cue appears, either early or late in the retention interval (d–f). After a
brief pause (g), the participant reports the color of the appropriate object (h) and then confirms the location of
the reported object (i).
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Figure 26: (continued)
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Figure 27: Performance differed when participants reported the best-remembered object versus one that was
selected at random. Performance was better when the cue came early in the retention interval than when it
came late.
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The ability to control working memory in a way that depends not only on external cues but also on
the current memory state opens up the possibility for newmaintenance strategies that make use of
metamemory to remember more. Two such strategies, mentioned above, at each moment prioritize
representation that is currently weakest or strongest. Other strategies are possible too, e.g. giving
graded preference to representations that are weakly represented, much like a conservationist might
allocate resources to species on the brink of extinction.
The time course of directed and self-directed remembering remains a crucial open question, and
the answer to it will determine the eﬀectiveness of self-directed maintenance as a strategy for remem-
bering more. Our participants made a single metamemory decision and then directed maintenance to
the selected representation for the remainder of the trial. More sophisticated maintenance strategies
might use multiple metamemory measurements, updating the target of maintenance to always reflect,
for example, the strongest or weakest memory. The act of using metamemory, selecting a target of
maintenance, and redirecting maintenance to the selected target all presumably take time. The longer
it takes to redirect maintenance using metamemory, the less feasible such an approach will be.
3.3 Computational framework: Markov decision process
The goal of this work is to define the space of possible maintenance strategies, considering both the
constraints and the sources of information that are available. Experiment 1 showed that the eﬃciency
of directed remembering depends on the load, as would be predicted from a stability threshold that
determines the weakest memory that can be maintained. Experiment 2 showed that maintenance can
be directed by information frommetamemory. Here, we extend the framework from Chapter 1 to
accommodate flexibility in working memory— i.e., control over the contents of memory according
to the demands of the task— as seen in both directed and self-directed remembering.
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Specifically, to describe these flexible maintenance behaviors, we extend the model presented in
Chapter 1 by drawing on tools from decision theory, likening the act of working memory mainte-
nance to a sequential decision process in which, at each moment, the maintenance process decides
which mental representations to prioritize. We focus on a particular kind of sequential decision pro-
cess known as theMarkov Decision Process, or mdp (Puterman, 1994), which provides an abstract
mathematical framework for describing decision making in a setting that is partly under control of
the decision maker (here, the control of maintenance) and partly under control of the environment
(here, the degradation process). Besides being well-suited to describing the problem of memory
maintenance, considering theMarkov Decision Process has the added benefit of it being one of the
most well-understood domains in the mathematics and psychology of reinforcement learning. Thus,
once the connection has been established, a multitude of existing concepts and tools from reinforce-
ment learning and decision theory can be brought to bear on the dynamics of memory maintenance.
An mdp is defined by a state space, a set of possible actions, a transition model, and a reward func-
tion, each explained in turn below.
3.3.1 State space
We suppose that there is a memory-supporting commodity divided intoN quanta, each assigned to
a particular memory structure. Themore of the commodity assigned to a structure, the stronger and
more robust the memory structure is. The state of memory is then an assignment of these quanta to
structures. A structure may receive the entire commodity, only a portion of it, or perhaps none at all.
One way to visualize the state space S for such a system is to consider the various ways thatN
quanta can be distributed among K structures. [Mathematically, this corresponds to a (K   1) reg-
ular discrete simplex—which, in the case of K = 3, consists of the points on the interior of a gridded
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triangle whose vertices represent full allocation to a single memory structure, see Fig. 28. There is a
point on the simplex that corresponds to the initial allocation.]
0
1 2 ...
(N, 0, 0)
(N/2, 0, N/2)
(0, 0, N)(0, N, 0)
Figure 28: The 2-simplex. Each point on the simplex represents a specific allocation of the commodity. At the
vertices, the entire commodity is allocated to a single memory structure. At the edges, one structure receives
none of the commodity.
3.3.2 Set of possible actions
At each time step, we allow the maintenance process to act by selecting a quantum as the target of
maintenance. Thus the set of possible actions A is of sizeN, one action per quantum, and does not
depend on the state.
3.3.3 Transition model
The transition model specifies the probability of moving from one memory state to another. We will
make use of the transition model proposed in Chapter 1— a generalizedMoran process with a sta-
bility threshold. This transition model assumes that at each time step, a quantum degrades because
another quantum interferes with it or replaces it. If any memory structure is so weak that it has fewer
than s quanta assigned to it, all those quanta become free floating and unassigned. [This defines a
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transition model Pr(s0 j s; a), which gives the probability of landing in state s0 given that the agent
took action awhile in state s (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Ewens, 2004). It is a formal model of memory
degradation.]
3.3.4 Reward function
Finally, there is the reward function. By definition, the agent’s goal is to maximize the total reward
that is received. The reward function is a mapping from states to an amount of reward that is received
for landing in that state. In the case of a visual working memory task with a retention interval that is
known to the participant, the reward function is time-varying, taking on a value of zero everywhere
until the moment of the test, at which point it becomes positive for some states and (possibly) zero
for others. The specifics of the reward function inevitably depend on the demands of the task and
are usually implicit in the experiment’s design and mechanism of feedback. For example, tasks using
the continuous partial report paradigm require participants to hold information in mind for a fixed
duration, e.g., 2000 ms, with reward provided in proportion to the similarity between the participant’s
response and the true value. Other tasks provide all-or-none feedback.
Three reward functions are commonly used in experiments on visual working memory. The first
applies to tasks with an all-or-none design in which the participant receives full credit (e.g., +1) for
having remembered anything at all about the cued object (i.e., having at least one quantum assigned
to it at the time of the test) and otherwise receives no reward. This reward function is appropriate
when scoring performance using a high-threshold model (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Cowan, 2001; Rouder
et al., 2008, 2011), considering only the probability of remembering while ignoring accuracy. The
second reward function applies to tasks in which the participant receives credit in proportion to the
closeness of the reported value to the actual value (e.g., proportional to 180   jxj, where x is the
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error in degrees in a circular dimension, such as hue), but with no penalty for blind guessing (e.g., by
providing an opt-out button or by filtering out guesses using a statistical procedure). The third reward
function applies to tasks in which both accuracy is important and guessing is penalized, modifying
the previous reward function by scoring all the responses, even those that are blind guesses.
3.3.5 Policies: unconditional
TheMarkov decision process is a general framework for describing the problem of sequential deci-
sion making, but it does not specify the particular strategy used by the agent to make a decision. That
strategy is defined by a policy, a function that specifies an action (or probability distribution over
actions) for each possible state. Much of modern research on mdps focuses on finding the optimal
policy, one that maximizes the (possibly time-discounted) reward (Monahan, 1982; Puterman, 1994;
Sutton & Barto, 1998; Kearns & Singh, 2002; Todorov, 2009).
The simplest maintenance policies do not depend on the current state of memory. Rather, they
produce the same behavior in every state. Borrowing terminology from game theory, in which a
player can adopt a strategy that does not depend on the behavior of the opponent (e.g., a player in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma who always defects), we call these maintenance policies unconditional (Rapoport,
1965; Axelrod &Hamilton, 1981). An example of an unconditional maintenance policy is all-i,
which selects the ith quantum as the target of maintenance. Another example of an unconditional
strategy is random, which selects a target at random, uniformly over all quanta. This maintenance
policy is equivalent to the neutral process from Chapter 1, and thus reproduces the full range of ex-
perimental results from that chapter.
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3.3.6 Policies: conditional
Conditional policies depend on the state. There are many conditional policies that are possible, but
we will focus on three that are needed to produce the behavioral results presented in Exps. 1 and 2:
all-j and Luce.
One example of a conditional policy is all-j, which selects a quantum uniformly from among
those assigned to structure j if one exists, otherwise choosing randomly among all the quanta. We
find that the all-j class of conditional policies is suﬃcient to produce directed remembering, with
performance being better for the prioritized object than for the neglected object, like it was in Exp. 1.
Specifically, we simulate the eﬀects of a participant who uses random until the cue is revealed and
then switches to all-j, where j is the memory structure that corresponds to the cued object (Fig. 29).
A particularly interesting class of policies is inspired by a psychological principle known as Luce’s
choice axiom (Luce, 1959; Herrnstein, 1961). According to the axiom, when faced with a choice
among alternatives, a decision maker will exhibit ‘matching behavior’, selecting options with proba-
bility proportional to their value. Matching behavior was originally studied in the context of learning
theory, where value is defined as the expected reward (Estes, 1957; Sutton & Barto, 1998). Thus if
two levers oﬀer rewards in a ratio of 2:1, an individual that displays matching behavior will press the
more rewarding lever twice as often. Here, value is akin to memory strength and is defined by the
number of quanta dedicated to a mnemonic structure.
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Figure 29: Reproducing directed remembering by simulating a conditional maintenance policy. Both panels
show forgetting functions for each of three objects that were presented (purple, yellow, and red lines), aver-
aged over 10,000 trials. The dashed vertical line marks the onset of the cue. In the upper panel, the participant
uses the random policy, which gives equal priority to all three objects. In the lower panel, the participant uses
the all-j policy, giving full priority to yellow and none to purple or red. Before the cue, the participants be-
have identically. After the cue, the behavior diverges, with yellow faring better than the other two. Simulations
were run with parameters N = 64 and K = 3 for 5000 steps, matching the best-fit parameters from Chapter 1.
The cue appeared at time step 1500.
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In practice, it is common to consider a generalization of matching behavior in which a real-valued
parameter L determines the decision-maker’s sensitivity to the signal. In this so-called “softmax” gen-
eralization of matching behavior, the probability of selecting option a from the set of alternatives A is
given by
p(a) =
v(a)LP
b2A
v(b)L
;
where v(x) is the strength of the signal generated by x and where L determines the decision maker’s
sensitivity to the signal (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Vul, 2010). Other softmax generalizations of match-
ing behavior are possible, many of which, like the Fermi function and Boltzmann distribution, are
borrowed from the field of statistical physics and provide a formal link between selection in various
domains (Ayala & Campbell, 1974; Blume, 1993; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Barabási & Albert, 1999;
Pan, 2010; Traulsen et al., 2007).
Five values of L are particularly significant for the process of memory maintenance. When L = 0,
the process is unconditional (i.e., insensitive to the signal). This corresponds to the neutral process
developed in Chapter 2. When L = 1, the process gives preference to objects in proportion to
how strongly they are currently represented. When L ! 1, the winner takes all. In contrast, when
L =  1, the process gives preference to objects in proportion to how weakly they are currently repre-
sented, and in the limit L!  1, the loser takes all.
The Luce family of maintenance policies can reproduce the eﬀects of self-directed remembering,
observed in Exp. 2 (Fig. 30).
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Figure 30: Reproducing self-directed remembering by simulating conditional maintenance policies. Once
again, both panels show forgetting functions for each of three objects that were presented (purple, yellow, and
red lines), averaged over 10,000 trials. The dashed vertical line again marks the onset of the cue. In the upper
panel, the participant uses the random policy, which gives equal priority to all three objects. Here, in the lower
panel, the participant uses the Luce policy with L=–1, assigning priority scores in proportion to how weakly the
object is currently represented. Before the cue, the participants behave identically. After the cue, the behavior
diverges, with the Luce policy faring better. Simulations were run with parameters N = 64, K = 3, and L 2 0; 1
for 5000 steps. The cue appeared at time step 1500.
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3.3.7 Partially observable minds
The framework of a Markov decision process makes a strong commitment to the accessibility of the
memory state to the memory maintenance system: it assumes perfect, real-time, no-cost metamem-
ory. However, the experiment reported in Chapter 1 gives us reason to believe that metamemory
may be imperfect. In that experiment, participants were more likely to remember an object when it
was chosen as best-remembered on that trial (92% 2) than when it was selected at random from
three objects (71% 3), even though the objects and displays were identical across the two condi-
tions (Fig. 16). From these data we can estimate the eﬃciency of realtime metamemory. Specifi-
cally, if participants remembered a randomly cued object 71% of the time, then we can infer that the
chance of remembering at least one of them (i.e., not having forgotten all three) is 1 – (1–0.71)3 =
0.98. When asked to pick out the best-remembered object, an ideal metamemorizer (one who per-
forms optimally given the information that is available) would be able to retrieve an object 98% of the
time. Our participants’ inability to reach this level of performance suggests that at least some of them
have less than ideal metamemory.
By generalizing the mdp to a partially observable world, we can accommodate situations of imper-
fect or costly metamemory. A partially observable world is one in which the agent does not know ex-
actly what state it is in, making it impossible to carry out conditional policies that depend on the state
without further information or assumptions. Often the agent has some instrument (a “sensor”) for
measuring or sensing the state. In the case of memory maintenance, the sensor is metamemory. The
agent uses the sensor to update its beliefs about the state. Thus the pomdp extends the mdp through
the introduction of a sensor model, which describes the information about the state that is provided
by each observation, and a belief state, which is a probability distribution over the state space that
embodies the agent’s beliefs about the current state (Monahan, 1982; Kaelbling et al., 1996). One
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possible belief state, a Dirichlet distribution with concentration parameters (4, 4, 4), is visualized
here as a surface on the simplex (Fig. 31).
 
 Supplementary Figure S2. Simulating uneven allocation policies.  (a)  A ternary plot that shows the noiseless uneven allocation policies used for simulations. At each point, the allocation to x1, x2, and x3 sums to 1. The corners correspond to the three policies for which one item is given all of the commodity. The center corresponds to a policy of even allocation across the items. Each filled circle corresponds to a fixed, uneven allocation policy that could produce at least as much variability in precision as we observed in our data. (b & c). Noisy allocation distributions are formalized as a Dirichlet distribution over the space of allocation policies, centered on even allocation. The distribution in panel (b) has lower noise levels (concentration parameters of 9, 9, and 9) than the one in panel (c) (concentration parameters of 4, 4, and 4).   
Figure 31: A Dirichlet distribution with concentration parameters 4, 4, and 4, representing one possible state
of metamemory beliefs about resource allocation. This corresponds to a situation where the memorizer be-
lieves that the commodity is fairly evenly spread among memories 1, 2, and 3. The belief state is one com-
ponent of metamem ry, capturing what the memorizer believes about the current state of its memory. The
sensor model is another component, capturing the information gained by metamemory observations.
In a partially observable mind, ineﬃciencies of metamemory limit the eﬃcacy of flexible mainte-
nance behaviors. This is because in a world where the future depends on the past, one who does not
even know the present cannot suitably plan for what is to come. We demonstrate this dependence
by defining a simple metamemory agent and then simulating its behavior with diﬀerent levels of ef-
ficiency. Metamemory observati ns mad by the ag t come in the form of object labels sampled
with probability proportional to their strength (that is, the number of quanta assigned to them). This
defines the sensor model. The agent is initially unaware of the allocation of the commodity, repre-
sented by a belief state initially set to a Dirichlet distribution with concentration parameters 1, 1, and
1, which is equivalent to a uniform distribution over all possible allocations. At each time step, the
agent makesm observations. We assume that the metamemory system has no memory of its own and
thus considers only the observations made at the current time step (see below for a brief discussion of
optimal filtering, in which the metamemory system also considers past observations). The Dirichlet
distribution is convenient for describing states of uncertainty about multinomial data both because
the Dirichlet is the conjugate prior for multinomial data and because its parameters act as pseudo-
counts, such that the a posteriori beliefs can be computed simply by incrementing the pseudocounts
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by the number of observations made of each type. To avoid the problems caused by sampling zero
quanta of a certain type, we use additive smoothing by adding one to all the counts. These counts are
used by the Luce policy, with exponent 1. The eﬃciency of metamemory can be varied by altering
the number of observations made at each time step. This formulation makes it possible to vary eﬃ-
ciency between two extremes. At one extreme,m = 0 and the agent gains no information about the
state. At the other extreme, in the limitm ! 1, the agent has perfect information about the state.
Intermediate eﬃciencies lead to intermediate performance (Fig. 32).
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Figure 32: Inefficiencies of metamemory limit the efficiency of memory maintenance. On the left are forgetting
functions for a simulated agent whose memory is only partially observable. At each time step the agent draws
m quanta (with replacement) and observes their tags. Selection happens according to the procedure in the
main text. On the right, performance increases with the number of samples taken. Simulations were run with
settings N = 128, K = 12, and L = –1.
We have defined a simple agent that uses metamemory to control memory maintenance. More
sophisticated approaches use the theory of optimal filtering. Filtering is the problem of estimating the
current state of a time-varying system given noisy observations of its past and present (Anderson &
Moore, 2012). Kalman filters and particle filters are two popular solutions to the filtering problem
that take into account the system’s dynamics and the statistical structure of the problem (Kalman
et al., 1960; Van DerMerwe et al., 2000).
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3.4 Discussion
This chapter began with two experiments on directed remembering. In the first experiment, we found
that the eﬃciency of directed remembering depends on the memory load, with larger loads leading to
less eﬃcient directed remembering. In the second experiment, we found that participants were able
to use metamemory to direct their maintenance behavior, which we call “self-directed remembering”.
We then extended the neutral model from Chapter 1 to describe flexible memory maintenance be-
haviors, including directed remembering and self-directed remembering. This was accomplished by
likening memory maintenance to a sequential decision problem in which, at each moment, the agent
decides which mental representations to prioritize. The strategy used by the agent to solve the prob-
lem of memory maintenance is defined by a policy. Diﬀerent policies lead to diﬀerent outcomes: the
all-i family of policies lead to a neutral process; the all-j family allows for directed remembering;
and the Luce family allows for self-directed remembering. Each policy was able to explain the pattern
of results seen in experiments. We then considered memory maintenance in a partially-observable
mind.
Accessibility
The theory of working memory has not traditionally included much of a role for the concept of acces-
sibility because working memories are thought to be actively maintained, such that a retrieval stage
seems unnecessary (Baddeley, 1992; Brady et al., 2013; Fougnie et al., 2014). However, there is a
growing body of evidence for a role of accessibility and retrieval in visual working memory (Fougnie
et al., 2014; Brady et al., 2013). For example, real-world objects can be stored in working memory
with various degrees of visual detail, and Brady et al. (2013) found that the lowest possible quality in
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working memory is similar to that found in long-termmemory, suggestive of a common limit— a
threshold of accessibility. The present work proposes a similar threshold of accessibility, though one
that operates during maintenance, not retrieval. In Chapter 1 this threshold helped us to explain the
crossover eﬀect in the forgetting functions of visual memory, and here it helps us to explain why the
eﬃciency of directed remembering depends on the load.
The maintenance problem
Sims et al. (2012) propose that the problem of visual working memory is that of transmitting visual
information from one point in time to another. In this conceptualization of the problem of working
memory, solutions take the form of encoders and decoders that maximize performance on a task.
Sims et al. found that formulating the problem of working memory in this way does an excellent job
of predicting behavioral performance and its dependence on the statistics of the visual input.
The present work views the problem of working memory diﬀerently because it takes seriously the
idea that maintenance is an active and controllable process. In this light, the problem of visual work-
ing memory is that of encoding visual information, maintaining it over a short duration, and then
later accessing it to perform a task well. The framework of theMarkov decision problemmakes it
possible to carefully specify the structure of the task (the environment and goals) and its possible
solutions.
Connections to other resource allocation tasks
Perhaps the biggest payoﬀ that comes from connecting the problem of working memory maintenance
to existing frameworks in mature fields such as decision theory and reinforcement learning is the set
of new questions that it makes possible to ask.
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For example, having delineated the set of possible maintenance policies, it becomes sensible to ask
which policy is optimal. As mentioned earlier, a considerable body of work in the field of reinforce-
ment learning explores methods for finding the optimal policy given the constraints of a particular
task (Monahan, 1982; Puterman, 1994; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Kearns & Singh, 2002; Zilli & Has-
selmo, 2008; Todorov, 2009). In the context of working memory, for example, policies that preferen-
tially maintain strong memories result in fewer representations that each have greater strength; these
policies are thus best suited for tasks that reward remembering much information about a few items.
In contrast, policies that preferentially maintain weak memories result in a greater number of repre-
sentations that are each weak; these policies are thus best suited for tasks that reward remembering
a little about everything. Determining the optimal maintenance strategy for the reward structures
commonly found in studies of visual working memory is a ripe area for future research.
One might also ask where maintenance policies come from. Specifically, how are they learned?
Methods such as temporal diﬀerence learning have emerged as candidate learning mechanisms used
in the brain to learn policies that guide behavior, and it has become popular to relate this particular
class of learning algorithms to known reward circuitry in the brain (Kaelbling et al., 1996; Hollerman
& Schultz, 1998; O’Doherty et al., 2003; O’Doherty, 2004; Maia, 2009; Schultz, 2010; Dayan &Niv,
2008). Particularly relevant is the work of Todd et al. (2008), who discuss methods for learning to
use working memory by temporal diﬀerence methods. Specifically, they showed how temporal dif-
ference learning can be used to shape representations in the prefrontal cortex so that they are useful
for working memory Todd et al. (2008). Also relevant is the work of (O’Reilly & Frank, 2006), who
developed an “actor/critic” model of the neural substrates of working memory and cognitive control.
They showed that an active gating mechanism that controls the contents of working memory can be
learned through learning mechanisms from reinforcement learning (O’Reilly & Frank, 2006).
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Finally, it may be useful to consider other resource allocation tasks that are similar in structure to
that of memory maintenance— e.g., scheduling and queuing. Much of the original work on these
problems came from the field of operations research, which originated frommilitary planners in
WWII and which today considers the optimal solutions to decision making and resource allocation
tasks in a variety of settings, often in the context of organizational behavior (Graﬀ, 1953; Taha, 2007)
or electronic systems (Åström&Wittenmark, 2011; Silberschatz et al., 2013). Having made the link
to these related problems, it may be fruitful to consider known solutions as candidate psychologi-
cal mechanisms. For example, queuing theory is a set of tools for considering resource allocation
tasks that feature the continuous arrival of entities that require the resource (e.g., callers to a com-
pany’s customer support center) (Kleinrock, 1975). Most of the popular working memory tasks are
episodic, with information arriving all at once and then being discarded at the end of the trial. Our
visual experience is not always so episodic; rather, it is sometimes necessary to update the contents of
working memory with new information or redirecting maintenance in light of new goals (Sandberg
et al., 2000; Matthey et al., 2012). Looking towards queuing theory, for example, may provide insight
into this problem of maintenance in the face of continuously-arriving information.
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4
Conclusion
This dissertation has argued that the maintenance of visual memories is akin to breathing:
it is a dynamic process with a default behavior that explains much of its usual workings, but which can
be observed, overridden, and controlled.
Chapter 1 showed that the default behavior of maintenance is well described by an evolutionary
process operating over the units of a memory-supporting cognitive commodity, like attention. In the
chapter, we extended the classic depiction of the dynamics of visual memory maintenance to include
competitive interactions between memories, fluid reallocation of a memory-supporting commodity,
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and a stability threshold that determines the weakest memory that can still be maintained. The pro-
posed model, based on these principles, can be understood as an evolutionary process with memories
competing over a limited memory-supporting commodity. Themodel reproduced the time course of
visual working memory observed in a series of experiments. Notable features of this time course in-
cluded load-dependent stability and overreaching, in which the act of trying to remember more infor-
mation causes people to forget faster, and to remember less, respectively. Our results demonstrated
that evolutionary models provide quantitative insights into the mechanisms of memory maintenance.
Chapter 2 showed that memories can be observed through real-time metamemory, an inward-
looking process that tracks the status of a memory as it degrades over time. Confidence in our mem-
ories is influenced by many factors, including beliefs about the perceptibility or memorability of cer-
tain kinds of objects and events, as well as knowledge about our skill sets, habits, and experiences.
Notoriously, our knowledge and beliefs about memory can lead us astray, causing us to be overly con-
fident in eyewitness testimony or to overestimate the frequency of recent experiences. We designed
a task that strips away all these potentially misleading cues, requiring observers to make confidence
judgments by directly assessing the quality of their memory representations. We show that individ-
uals can monitor the status of a memory as it degrades over time. Our findings suggest that people
have access to information reflecting the existence and quality of their memories, and furthermore,
that they can use this information to guide their behavior.
Chapter 3 showed that the default maintenance behavior can be overridden and controlled by the
processes of directed forgetting and self-directed remembering, which redirect maintenance in ac-
cordance with the goals. We found that the eﬃciency of directed forgetting depends on the memory
load. This follows naturally from the proposed stability threshold. Specifically, when there are few
representations, directed forgetting is eﬃcient, shifting maintenance across objects without much
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cost. However, when there are many representations, directed forgetting is ineﬃcienct, such that
shifting maintenance to prioritize one object comes at a big cost: fewer remembered objects in total.
The chapter then combined the default behavior, metamemory, and directed forgetting into a formal
framework borrowed from the field of reinformement learning. We extended the neutral model from
Chapter 1 to describe flexible memory maintenance behaviors, including directed forgetting and self-
directed remembering. This was accomplished by likening memory maintenance to a sequential deci-
sion problem in which, at each moment, the agent decides which mental representations to prioritize.
The strategy used by the agent to solve the problem of memory maintenance is defined by a policy.
Diﬀerent policies lead to diﬀerent outcomes: the all-i family of policies lead to a neutral process;
the all-j family allows for directed forgetting; and the Luce family allows for self-directed remem-
bering. And the eﬃciency of metamemory limits the eﬃcacy of conditional maintenance policies in a
partially observable mind.
The two dominant approaches to studying the processes that underly working memory— psy-
chophysics and cognitive neuroscience— conceive of the problem of memory maintenance diﬀer-
ently. Psychophysics studies how performance on a task changes as the spatiotemporal properties of
the stimulus are adjusted (Fechner, 1860; Stevens, 1975). In this light, memory maintenance is de-
fined by properties of the stimulus that aﬀect it. Cognitive neuroscience studies the neural substrates
of cognition and how those substrates together produce experience and behavior (Gazzaniga, 2004).
In this light, maintenance is defined by its neural mechanisms.
This dissertation combined the techniques of psychophysics with a third approach— the compu-
tational approach—which delineates three levels of analysis that are needed to explain any cognitive
phenomenon: the computational, the algorithmic, and the physical (Marr, 1982; Chater &Oaksford,
1998). Most relevant here are the computational and algorithmic levels, which describe the structure
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of the task at hand, the logic of possible solutions, and the rules by which those solutions are carried
out. Each chapter of the dissertation aimed at applying this kind of thinking to some aspect of our
ability to maintain visual memories. Working memory is a flexible system, capable of many behav-
iors. The aspiration here is that by posing the problem of working memory in this way— as that of
an agent who decides what to prioritize in a partially observable mind— it will become possible to
discover the correspondingly rich and varied solutions taken to solve the maintenance problem.
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A
Forgetting functions of visual memory
In the following derivations, we suppose that the participant is asked to remember a set of K things
(the memory load), stored as objects, features, or hierarchical bundles of features (hereafter, “mem-
ory structures” or just “structures”). We further suppose that visual memory is limited and imperfect,
such that only Y  K of the structures are stored. The quantity Y is allowed to vary as a function of
the time t since the oﬀset of the stimulus. Then, for each model we can define a forgetting function that
relates the expected number of stored structures to time. For each of the four models of visual mem-
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ory compared in the main text, we derive expressions for its forgetting function.
A.0 Model #1: Classic
The classic model of the time course of visual memory, still used in modern applications (Lu et al.,
2005; Kuhbandner et al., 2011; Hahn et al., 2011), emerged in the 1960s from research using the
partial report paradigm (Sperling, 1960). That work revealed the existence of iconic memory, a stor-
age system with a high capacity and whose contents is short-lived, typically fading within a second
(Sperling, 1960). Under the classic model, working memory and iconic memory are together re-
sponsible for behavioral performance. The contribution of working memory is at most its full capac-
ity β, which is unchanging over time. The contribution of iconic memory above and beyond that of
working memory is often called the “partial report superiority eﬀect” and is at most all of the remain-
ing K   β things that were not stored in working memory. The partial report superiority eﬀect has
been found to decline exponentially as a function of time, and so the forgetting function of the classic
model is given by
E[Y(t)] =
8>>><>>>:
β+ (K  β)e tτ if β  K
K if β > K;
(A.1)
where τ is the mean lifetime of an item held in iconic memory.
A.1 Model #2: Pure death
The previous model assumed that working memory is stable over time. But working memory is
known to degrade (Zhang & Luck, 2009; Yang, 1999). For simplicity, we assume that degradation
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in working memory is a pure death process in which structures are lost independently over time and
independently of each other, each having a mean lifetime of τ2. First consider the case of β  K,
where working memory is exhausted. In this case, the probability that a randomly chosen structure
is stored in working memory is βK e
 t
τ2 . The probability that it is stored in iconic memory is e tτ . Thus
the forgetting function, which tracks the expected number of objects held in at least one of the two
systems, is given by
E[Y(t)] = K  K

1  β
K
e t=τ2

1  e t=τ

: (A.2)
In the case of β > K, where working memory has room to spare, the term βK is replaced by unity
because every structure is guaranteed a place. In the limit τ2 ! 1, the pure death model reduces to
the classic model.
A.2 Model #3: Sudden death
In 2009, Zhang & Luck proposed a “sudden death” model where after a window of initial stability
lasting approximately four seconds, entire objects are lost over time, but the quality of those that sur-
vive is constant (Zhang & Luck, 2009). A reasonable way to formalize this model is to equip the pure
death process with an initial grace period that lasts until time tdeath. The forgetting function for this
sudden death model is then governed by the classic model when t < tdeath and by the pure death
model when t  tdeath. Note that, because of the initial grace period, when used in the sudden death
model, the term tτ2 in Eq. 2.2 must be replaced by
t tdeath
τ2 .
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A.3 Model #4: Evolutionary model
Here, we derive the forgetting function of the evolutionary model with the stability threshold set
to s = 1, i.e., the Moran process (Moran, 1958, 1962). For s  1, we determined the forgetting
functions numerically.
We considerN quanta, each of which is assigned to one of the K structures at any given time. We
suppose that the structures stored in these quanta undergo a process of neutral drift, modeled as a
continuous-timeMoran or pairwise comparison process. It is convenient to scale time so that one
time unit corresponds toN “generations” of this process, so that the contents of each quantum is up-
dated once per unit time, on average.
Decay of founding lineages
When stimuli are first presented to a subject, each quantum is immediately assigned a single struc-
ture. We consider this to be the “founding generation” of structures stored in memory. At any subse-
quent time, the contents of each quantum will be a copy (or a copy-of-a-copy, etc.) of a member of
this founding generation. Over time, the lineages (copies and copies-of-copies, etc.) of this founding
generation may grow or disappear through random drift. Eventually only one lineage will remain.
We first ask howmany lineages from the founding generation will survive to time t > 0. This ques-
tion can be addressed using results from population genetics. We represent the number of founding
lineages that persist at time t by the random variable X(t). The expectation of this random variable is
(Tavaré, 1984):
E[X(t)] = 1+
MX
`=2
(2`  1)
 M
`
 M+` 1
`
 e (`2)t:
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The forgetting function
We now consider the forgetting function—that is, the expected number of distinct structures that
survive in memory at a given time. We suppose that, at time t = 0, each quantum is assigned ran-
domly to one of K structures. We represent the the number of structures remaining at time t  0 by
the random variable Y(t). The expected number of structures remembered at time t can be written as
E[Y(t)] = 1+
NX
`=2
CN;K` e
 (`2)t; (A.3)
with the coeﬃcients CN;K` given by
CN;K` = ( 1)` (2`  1)
 N
`
 N+` 1
`
 K  1K 2F1

`+ 1; 2  `; 2; K  1
K

: (A.4)
Above, 2F1 is the hypergeometric function. The derivation of the forgetting function is given in the
next two sections.
In the limitN ! 1 (that is, if memory is regarded as a continuous resource) the forgetting func-
tion converges to
E[Y(t)] = 1+
1X
`=2
CK` e
 (`2)t;
with
CK` = ( 1)` (2`  1)
K  1
K 2
F1

`+ 1; 2  `; 2; K  1
K

:
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Trinomial coefficients
Our derivation of the forgetting function Eq. 2.3 relies on identities involving trinomial coeﬃcients.
For nonnegative integersM; i; jwith i+ j  M, the corresponding trinomial coeﬃcient is defined as

M
i j M  i  j

=
K!
i!j!(K  i  j)! :
Trinomial coeﬃcients arise as coeﬃcients in the expansion of (x+ y+ z)M. In particular, we have
( x+ y+ 1)M =
X
i+j=M
i0;j0
( 1)i

M
i j M  i  j

xiyj:
From the above expansion, we can derive the following relations:
M jX
i=0
( 1)i

M
i j M  i  j

=
1
j!
@j
@yj
( x+ y+ 1)M

(x;y)=(1;0)
=

M
j

( x+ y+ 1)M j

(x;y)=(1;0)
=
8>>><>>>:
1 j = M
0 otherwise.
(A.5)
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M jX
i=0
( 1)ii

M
i j M  i  j

=
1
j!
@
@x
@j
@yj
( x+ y+ z)M

(x;y;z)=(1;0;1)
=

M
j

@
@x
( x+ y+ z)M j

(x;y;z)=(1;1;0)
=  

M
j

(M  j)( x+ y+ z)M j 1

(x;y;z)=(1;1;0)
=
8>>><>>>:
 M j = M  1
0 otherwise.
(A.6)
Combining the previous two identities yields a third:
MX
k=j
( 1)k jk

M
M  k k  j j

=
M jX
i=0
( 1)i(i+ j)

M
M  i  j i j

=
M jX
i=0
( 1)ii

M
i j M  i  j

+ j
M jX
i=0
( 1)i

M
i j M  i  j

=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
 M j = M  1
M j = M
0 otherwise.
(A.7)
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Derivation of the forgetting function
We now derive the forgetting function for the evolutionary model. First we suppose that n of theN
founding lineages remain after time t; that is, X(t) = n. Since neutral drift does not favor any struc-
ture over any other, we can regard these n lineages as being assigned randomly among the K struc-
tures. This situation thus reduces to the classical probability problem of randomly partitioning a set of
n elements into K or fewer subsets.
For k  n, the probability that k of the K items are represented in these n lineages is
Pr[Y(t) = kjX(t) = n] =

K
k
8><>:nk
9>=>; k!
Kn
: (A.8)
Above,
8><>:nk
9>=>; denotes the (n; k)th Stirling number of the second kind—that is, the number of ways
to partition a set of n elements into k non-empty subsets. This Stirling number can be obtained by the
formula
8><>:nk
9>=>; = 1k!
kX
j=0
( 1)k j

k
j

jn: (A.9)
Combining these equations yields
Pr[Y(t) = kjX(t) = n] =

K
k
 kX
j=0
( 1)k j

k
j

j
K
n
;
or equivalently, upon rearranging,
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Pr[Y(t) = kjX(t) = n] =
kX
j=0
( 1)k j

K
K  k k  j j

j
K
n
: (A.10)
The trinomial coeﬃcient arises via the relation

K
k

k
j

=

K
K  k k  j j

:
Nowwe consider the overall expected number of items remembered at time t by summing Eq.
2.10 over values of nweighted by their probabilities:
E[Y(t)] =
KX
k=1
k
kX
j=0
( 1)k j

K
K  k k  j j
 NX
n=1

j
K
n
Pr[X(t) = n]
=
KX
k=1
k
kX
j=0
( 1)k j

K
K  k k  j j

G(j=K; t); (A.11)
Above,G(x; t) is the probability generating function of X(t):
G(x; t) =
NX
n=1
xn Pr[X(t) = n]:
We use a previously discovered (Tavaré, 1984) formula for this generating function:
G(x; t) = x+ x(1  x)
NX
`=2
(2`  1)( 1)`+1
 N
`
 N+` 1
`
 2F1(`+ 1; 2  `; 2; x) e (`2)t: (A.12)
Substituting in Eq. 2.11, we obtain
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E[Y(t)] =
KX
k=1
k
kX
j=0
( 1)k j

K
K  k k  j j


"
j
K
+
j
K

1  j
K
 NX
`=2
(2`  1)( 1)`+1
 N
`
 N+` 1
`
 2F1(`+ 1; 2  `; 2; j=K) e (`2)t# (A.13)
Using identity 2.6, we can simplify the term that is linear in j=K:
KX
k=1
k
kX
j=0
j
K
( 1)k j

K
K  k k  j j

= 1:
Eq. 2.13 therefore reduces to
E[Y(t)] = 1+
KX
k=1
k
kX
j=0
( 1)k j

K
K  k k  j j

 j
K

1  j
K
 NX
`=2
(2`  1)( 1)`+1
 N
`
 N+` 1
`
 2F1(`+ 1; 2  `; 2; j=K) e (`2)t:
In summary, the expected number of items remembered can be written as
E[Y(t)] = 1+
MX
`=2
CN;K` e
 (`2)t;
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with
CN;K` = ( 1)`+1(2`  1)
 N
`
 N+` 1
`


KX
k=1
k
kX
j=0
( 1)k j

K
K  k k  j j

j
K

1  j
K

 2F1(`+ 1; 2  `; 2; j=K): (A.14)
To simplify this expression for CN;K` we reorder sums:
KX
k=1
k
kX
j=0
( 1)k j

K
K  k k  j j

j
K

1  j
K

2F1(`+ 1; 2  `; 2; j=K)
=
KX
j=0
j
K

1  j
K

2F1(`+ 1; 2  `; 2; j=K)
KX
k=j
( 1)k jk

K
K  k k  j j

: (A.15)
Simplifying the second (nested) sum according to identity Eq. 2.7, we obtain Eq. 2.4.
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B
Data analysis with theMemToolbox
B.1 Abstract
TheMemToolbox is a collection of matlab functions for modeling visual working memory. In sup-
port of its goal to provide a full suite of data analysis tools, the toolbox includes implementations
of popular models of visual working memory, real and simulated data sets, Bayesian and maximum
likelihood estimation procedures for fitting models to data, visualizations of data and fit, validation
routines, model comparison metrics, and experiment scripts. TheMemToolbox is released under the
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permissive bsd license and is available at memtoolbox.org.
B.2 Introduction
Working memory is a storage system that actively holds information in mind and allows for its ma-
nipulation, providing a workspace for thought (Baddeley, 1986). Its strikingly limited capacity has
inspired a slew of research aimed at characterizing those limits in terms of the spatiotemporal proper-
ties of the stimulus and the age, intelligence, tiredness, and mental health of the individual.
A handful of experimental paradigms are predominant in the study of working memory. These in-
clude the delayed match-to-sample task used in studies of animal cognition (Blough, 1959) and the
span tasks used in studies of verbal working memory (Daneman &Carpenter, 1980). Research on
visual working memory relies primarily on two tasks: partial report and change detection (Fig. 33).
In a partial report task, the participant is shown a set of letters, shapes, or colorful dots, and then after
a brief delay is asked to report the properties of one or a subset of the items (Sperling, 1960; Wilken
&Ma, 2004; Zhang & Luck, 2008). In a change detection task, the participant is shown a pair of dis-
plays, one after the other, and is asked a question that requires comparing them, such as whether they
match (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Phillips, 1974; Pashler, 1988).
Formal models have been proposed that link performance in change detection and partial report
tasks to the architecture and capacity of the working memory system. These include the item limit
model (Pashler, 1988), the slot model (Luck & Vogel, 1997; Cowan, 2001), the slots+averaging
model (Zhang & Luck, 2008), the slots+resources model (Awh et al., 2007), the continuous resource
model (Wilken &Ma, 2004), the resources+swaps model (Bays et al., 2009), the ensemble statis-
tics+items model (Brady & Alvarez, 2011), and the variable-precision model (van den Berg et al.,
2012; Fougnie et al., 2012). Each model specifies the structure of visual memory and the decision
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Figure 33: (a) A continuous partial report task. The observer sees the stimulus display, and then after a delay
is asked to report the exact color of a single item. (b) A change detection task. The observer sees the stimulus
display, then after a delay is asked to report whether the test display matches.
process used to perform the task.
Having been fit to the data, these models are used to make claims about the architecture and ca-
pacity of memory. For example, using an item limit model to fit data from a change detection task,
Luck & Vogel (1997) showed that observers can remember the same number of objects regardless
of whether they store one or two features per object (e.g., only color vs. both color and orientation),
and from this inferred that the storage format of visual working memory is integrated objects, not in-
dividual features. Using data from a continuous partial report task, Brady & Alvarez (2011) showed
that when items are presented in a group, memory for an individual item is biased towards the group
average, and from this inferred that working memory is hierarchical, representing both ensembles of
items and individual items.
B.3 TheMemToolbox
We created theMemToolbox, a collection of matlab functions for modeling visual working mem-
ory. The toolbox provides everything needed to perform the analyses commonly used in studies of
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Figure 34: An example of a model’s fit to continuous partial report data. Most responses fall within a relatively
small range around the target item’s true value, but some response are far off. These data are fit using the
mixture model of Zhang & Luck (2008), which attributes the gap in performance to differences in the state of
memory for the target item: with probability g the observer remembers nothing about the item and guesses
randomly; with probability 1–g the observer has a noisy representation of the item, leading to responses cen-
tered at the true value and with a standard deviation sd that reflects the quality of the observer’s memory.
visual working memory, including model implementations, maximum likelihood routines, and data
validation checks, although it defaults to a Bayesian workflow that encourages a deeper look into the
data and the models’ fits. In the following sections, we highlight the toolbox’s core functionality and
describe the improvements it oﬀers to the standard workflow. We begin by reviewing the standard
workflow and its implementation in the toolbox.
B.3.1 The standardworkflow
The experimenter first picks a model. Then, to fit the model to experimental data using probabilis-
tic methods, a likelihood function is defined that describes the model’s predictions for each possible
setting of its parameters. (Formally, given a modelMwith free parameters θ, the model’s likelihood
function specifies a probability distribution P(Djθ) over possible datasetsD.) With the likelihood
function in hand, an estimator is used to pick the parameter settings that provide the best fit to the
data. A popular choice is the maximum likelihood estimator, which selects the parameter values that
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maximize the model’s likelihood function given the data (Dempster et al., 1977; Lagarias et al., 1998).
Typically, this procedure is performed separately for each participant and experimental condition,
resulting in parameter estimates that are then compared using traditional statistical tests (e.g., Zhang
& Luck, 2008).
TheMemToolbox uses two matlab structures (“structs”) to organize the information needed
to analyze data using the standard workflow: one that describes the data to be fit, and another that
describes the model and its likelihood function.
Fitting a set of data with a model is then as simple as calling the built-in MLE() function. For ex-
ample, if data was obtained from a continuous color report task where an observer made errors of -89
degrees, 29 degrees, etc, a model could be fit using the following workflow:
>> model = StandardMixtureModel();
>> data.errors = [-89,29,-2,6,-16,65,43,-12,10,0,178,-42];
>> fit = MLE(data, model)
This will return the maximum likelihood parameters for this observer’s data, allowing for standard
analysis techniques to be used.
Thus, with little eﬀort, the MemToolbox can be used to simplify (and speed-up) existing work-
flows by allowing for straightforward fitting of nearly all of the standard models used in the visual
working memory literature. In support of this goal, the toolbox includes descriptive models such as
the StandardMixtureModel (that of Zhang & Luck, 2008) and SwapModel of Bays et al. (2009),
as well as several explanatory models, such as VariablePrecisionModel (e.g., van den Berg et al.,
2012; Fougnie et al., 2012). For more information about a particular model m, type help m at the
matlab prompt. For example, to access the help file for StandardMixtureModel, run
help StandardMixtureModel. It is also possible to view the full code for a model by running
edit m. (In fact, this applies to any function in the toolbox.) For example, to view the code for the
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swap model, type edit SwapModel, which will show the model’s probability distribution function,
the parameters’ ranges, and the specification of priors for the model’s parameters.
The toolbox also includes a number of wrapper functions that extend existing models and make
themmore robust. For example, the wrapper function WithBias()adds a bias term, WithLapses()
adds an inattention parameter, and Orientation() alters a model so that it uses a 180 deg error
space, appropriate for objects that are rotationally symmetric, e.g., line segments. Inattention param-
eters are particularly important because deciding whether to include such parameters has an inor-
dinate influence on parameter estimation and model selection (Rouder et al., 2008). Many of the
standard models in the toolbox (e.g., StandardMixtureModel) already include such inattention
parameters.
B.3.2 The Bayesian workflow
By default, instead of returning the maximum likelihood estimate, the toolbox uses a Bayesian work-
flow that constructs a full probability distribution over parameter values. This probability distribution
describes the reasonableness of each possible parameter setting after considering the observed data,
in light of prior beliefs. In doing so, it strongly encourages a thorough examination of model fit. The
Bayesian workflow is implemented as MemFit, the toolbox’s primary fitting function.
>> fit = MemFit(data, model)
Bayesian inference provides a rational rule for updating prior beliefs (“the prior”) based on ex-
perimental data. The prior, P(θ), conveys which parameter values are thought to be reasonable, and
specifying it can be as straightforward as setting upper and lower bounds (for example, bounding
the guess rate between 0 and 1). Analysts add value through judicious selection of priors that faith-
fully reflect their beliefs. Because a prior can have arbitrarily large impact on the resulting inference,
it is important both to carefully consider which distribution is appropriate, and, when communicat-
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ing results that depend on those inferences, to report exactly the choice that was made. For the pur-
poses of exploratory data analysis, it is common to use a noninformative or weakly informative prior
that spreads the probability thinly over a swath of plausible parameter values (e.g., the Jeﬀreys prior,
a class of noninformative priors that are invariant under reparameterization of the model; Jeﬀreys,
1946; Jaynes, 1968) to avoid an inordinate influence of the prior on inferences.
Once specified, beliefs are then updated (according to Bayes’ rule) to take into account the experi-
mental data. Bayes’ rule stipulates that after observing dataD, the posterior beliefs about the parame-
ters (“the posterior”) are given by
P(θjD) / P(Djθ)  P(θ);
which combines the likelihood of the data given the parameters with the prior probability of the pa-
rameters.
Estimating the full posterior distribution is harder than finding the maximum likelihood estimate.
For some models it is possible to derive closed-form expressions for the posterior distribution, but
for most models this is intractable and so sampling-based algorithms are used to approximate it. One
such algorithm, theMetropolis-Hastings variant of Markov ChainMonte Carlo (mcmc), is applica-
ble to a wide range of models and is thus the one used by the toolbox (Metropolis et al., 1953; Hast-
ings, 1970). The algorithm chooses an initial set of model parameters, and then, over many iterations,
proposes small moves to these parameter values, accepting or rejecting them based on how probable
the new parameter values are in both the prior and the likelihood function. In this way, it constructs
a random walk that visits parameter settings with frequency proportional to their probability under
the posterior. This allows the estimation of the full posterior of the model in a reasonable amount of
time, and is theoretically equivalent to the more straightforward (but much slower) technique of eval-
uating the model’s likelihood and prior at every possible setting of the parameters (implemented in
109
the GridSearch function). For an introduction to mcmc, we recommend Andrieu et al. (2003). The
MemToolbox includes an implementation of mcmc that attempts, as best as possible, to automate
the process of sampling from the posterior of the models that are included in the toolbox.
With the posterior distribution in hand, there are a number of ways to analyze and visualize the
results. First, the maximum of the posterior distribution (themaximum a posteriori or map esti-
mate) can be used as a point-estimate that is analogous to the maximum likelihood estimate, diﬀering
only in the map’s consideration of the prior (This estimate can be calculated directly using the map
function). However, visualizing the full posterior distribution also provides information about how
well the data constrain the parameter values and whether there are trade-oﬀs between parameters
(Fig. 35).
Fig. 35 shows a posterior distribution for data analyzed with the standard mixture model of Zhang
& Luck (2008). The plots on the main diagonal are histograms of values for each parameter, the so-
called “marginals” of the posterior distribution; the plots on the oﬀ-diagonals reveal correlations
between parameters. Note that in the standard mixture model, there is a slight negative correlation
between the standard deviation parameter and the guess rate parameter: data can be seen as hav-
ing either a slightly higher guess rate and lower standard deviation, or a slightly lower guess rate and
higher standard deviation. Examining the full posterior reveals this tradeoﬀ, which remains hidden
when using maximum likelihood fits. This is important when drawing conclusions that depend on
how these two parameters relate. For example, Anderson et al. (2011) found correlations between
a measure based on guess rate and another based on standard deviation, and used this to argue that
each observer has a fixed personal number of discrete memory slots. However, because the param-
eters trade oﬀ, such correlations are meaningful only if the estimates are derived from independent
sets of data; otherwise the correlations are inflated by the noise in estimating the parameters (Brady
et al., 2011a). Thus, understanding the full posterior distribution is critical to correctly estimating
parameters and their relationships to each other.
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Figure 35: An example of the full posterior of the standard mixture model of Zhang & Luck (2008), where g is
the guess rate and sd is the standard deviation of observers’ report for remembered items. On the diagonal are
plots that show the posterior for an individual parameter – e.g., the distribution for guess rate (g) is plotted in
the top left corner. We can see that the data make us quite confident that the guess rate is between 0.08 and
0.11. On the off-diagonals are the correlations between the parameters – for example, the top right axis shows
guess rate (y-axis) plotted against standard deviation (x-axis). Each row and each column corresponds to a
parameter, e.g., the x-axis for all the plots in the second column corresponds to standard deviation.
B.3.3 Posterior predictive checks
Another technique applied by theMemToolbox is the automatic use of posterior predictive checks.
Sometimes a whole class of models performs poorly, such that there are no parameter settings that
will produce a good fit. In this case, maximum likelihood and maximum a posteriori estimates are
misleading: they dutifully pick out the best, even if the best is still quite bad. A good practice then
is to check the quality of the fit, examining which aspects of the data it captures and which aspects it
misses (Gelman et al., 1996, 2004). This can be accomplished through a posterior predictive check,
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which simulates new data from the posterior fit of the model, and then compares the histograms of
the actual and simulated data (Fig. 36). MemFit performs posterior predictive checks by default.
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Figure 36: (a) Simulated data from the posterior of the model (green), with the actual data overlaid (black).
The mismatch between the two is symptomatic of a poor fit. (b) The difference between the simulated and
real data, bounded by 95% credible intervals. If at any spot the credible interval does not include zero, it is an
indication that the model does not accurately fit the data.
Amodel that can accurately fit the data in a posterior predictive check does not necessarily provide
a good fit. For example, the model may fit the averaged data but fail to fit observers’ data from indi-
vidual displays, perhaps because of reports of incorrect items (Bays et al., 2009) or because of the use
of grouping or ensemble statistics (Brady & Tenenbaum, 2013). In addition, a good fit does not nec-
essarily indicate a good model: an extremely flexible model that can mimic any data always provides
a good fit, but this provides no evidence in favor of that model (Roberts & Pashler, 2000). However,
models that systematically deviate in a posterior predictive check nearly always need improvement.
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B.3.4 Hierarchical modeling
Typically, the question of interest in working memory research is not about a single observer, but a
population: Do older individuals have reduced working memory capacity? Do people guess more of-
ten when there is more to remember? When aggregating results frommultiple participants to answer
such questions, the standard technique is to separately fit a model to the data from each participant
(using, for example, maximum likelihood estimation) and to combine parameter estimates across
participants by taking their average or median. Diﬀerences between conditions are then examined
through t-tests or anovas. This approach to analyzing data frommultiple participants allows gen-
eralization to the population as a whole, since participant variance is taken into account by treating
parameters as random eﬀects (Daw, 2011). One flaw with this approach is that it entirely discards
information about the reliability of each participant’s parameter estimates. This is particularly prob-
lematic when there are diﬀerences in how well the data constrain the parameters of each participant
(e.g., because of diﬀerences in the number of completed trials), or when there are significant trade-
oﬀs between parameters (as in the parameters of the standard model), in which case analyzing them
separately can be problematic (Brady et al., 2011a). For example, the standard deviation parameter
of the standard mixture model is considerably less constrained at high guess rates than at low guess
rates. Thus, even with the same number of trials, our estimate of the standard deviation will be more
reliable for participants with lower guess rates than those with higher guess rates.
A better technique, although one that is more computationally intensive, is to fit a single hierar-
chical model of all participants (e.g., Morey, 2011; Rouder et al., 2003; Rouder & Lu, 2005). This
treats each participant’s parameters as samples from a normally distributed population and uses the
data to infer the population mean and SD of each parameter. This technique automatically gives more
weight to participants whose data give more reliable parameters estimates and causes “shrinkage” of
each participant’s parameter estimates towards the population mean, sensibly avoiding extreme val-
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ues caused by noisy data. For example, using maximum likelihood estimates, participants with high
guess rates are sometimes estimated to have guess rates near zero but standard deviations of 3000 deg
(resulting in a nearly flat normal distribution). This problem is avoided by fitting participants in a
hierarchical model.
By default, when given multiple data sets, one per participant, MemFitwill separately fit the model
to each participant’s data. Hierarchical modeling is performed by passing an optional parameter, ‘Use-
Hierarchical’, to MemFit:
>> data1 = MemDataset(1);
>> data2 = MemDataset(2);
>> model = StandardMixtureModel();
>> fit = MemFit({data1,data2}, model, ’UseHierarchical’, true)
Fitting such models is computationally more diﬃcult, and so you should ensure the estimation
procedure has correctly converged (e.g., using the PlotConvergence function provided by the tool-
box) before relying on the parameter estimates to make inferences.
B.3.5 Model comparison
Which model best describes the data? Answering this question requires considering both the resem-
blance between the model and the data and also the model’s flexibility. Flexible models can fit many
data sets, and so a good fit provides only weak evidence of a good match between model and data.
In contrast, a good fit between an inflexible model and the data provides stronger evidence of a good
match. To account for this, many approaches to model comparison penalize more flexible models;
these include the Akaike Information Criterion with correction for finite data (aicc; Akaike, 1974;
Burnham& Anderson, 2004), the Bayesian Information Criterion (bic; Schwarz, 1978), the De-
viance Information Criterion (dic; Spiegelhalter et al., 2002), and the Bayes factor (Kass & Raftery,
1995). It is also possible to perform cross-validation— fitting and testing separate data— to elim-
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inate the advantage of a more flexible model. Implementations of some of these model comparison
techniques are provided by theMemToolbox, and can be accessed by passing multiple models to the
MemFit function:
>> model1 = StandardMixtureModel();
>> model2 = SwapModel();
>> modelComparison = MemFit(data, {model1, model2})
This will output model comparison metrics and describe them, including which model is preferred by
each metric.
Despite the array of tools provided by theMemToolbox, we do not wish to give the impression
that model selection can be automated. Choosing between competing models is no easier or more
straightforward than choosing between competing scientific theories (Pitt &Myung, 2002). Selec-
tion criteria like aicc are simply tools for understanding model fits, and it is important to consider
their computational underpinnings when deciding which criterion to use— before performing the
analysis. For example, the criteria included in the toolbox are calibrated diﬀerently in terms of how
strongly they penalize complex models, with criteria such as aicc having an inconsistent calibration
that penalizes complex models less than criteria such as bic, which penalizes complex models in a
way that depends on their functional form, taking into account correlations between parameters.
DIC is the only method appropriate in a hierarchical setting.
In addition to choosing an appropriate model comparison metric, we recommend computing the
metric for each participant independently and looking at consistency across participants to make in-
ferences about the best fitting models. Importantly, by fitting independently for each participant, you
can take into account participant variance, and are thus able to generalize to the population as a whole
(for example, by using an anova over model likelihoods). By contrast, computing a single aicc or
bic value across all participants does not allow generalization to the population, as it ignores partici-
pant variance; one participant that is fit much better by a particular model can drive the entire aicc or
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bic value. This kind of fixed eﬀects analysis can thus seriously overstate the true significance of results
(Stephan et al., 2010). As in the case of estimating parameters, this technique of estimating model
likelihoods for each participant and then performing an anova or t-test over these parameters is only
an approximation to the fully Bayesian hierarchical model that considers the evidence simultaneously
from each participant (Stephan et al., 2009); however, in the case of model comparison, the simpler
technique is likely suﬃcient for most visual working memory experiments.
To facilitate this kind of analysis, the MemToolbox performs model comparison on individual
participant data and MemFit calculates many of the relevant model comparison metrics, so that you
may choose the appropriate comparison for your theoretical claim.
B.4 Availability, contents, & help
TheMemToolbox is available on the web at memtoolbox.org. To install the toolbox, place it some-
where sensible and then run the included Setup.m script, which will add it to matlab’s default path.
The distribution includes source code, demos, and a tutorial that reviews all of the toolbox’s function-
ality. It is released under a bsd license, allowing free use for research or teaching. The organization of
the toolbox’s folder structure is outlined in the file MemToolbox/Contents.m. Detailed descriptions
of each function (e.g., MCMC) can be found in the help sections contained in each file. To access the
help section for some function f from the matlab prompt, run help f.
B.5 Conclusion
We created theMemToolbox for modeling visual working memory. The toolbox provides everything
needed to perform the analyses routinely used in visual working memory, including model imple-
mentations, maximum likelihood routines, and data validation checks. In addition, it provides tools
that oﬀer a deeper look into the data and the fit of the model to the data. This introduction gave a
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high-level overview of its approach and core features. To learn to use the toolbox, we recommend the
tutorial, available at memtoolbox.org.
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